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The Problems Of Moral Psychology
Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three essays centered around outstanding fundamental problems in
the field of moral psychology. These fundamental problems concern both metaphysical and
methodological disagreements – namely, what is the subject-matter of moral psychology? And what are
the methods for the investigation of that subject-matter? The first chapter examines the problem of
marking the domain of moral psychology by isolating its subject-matter and the various methodologies
for investigating it. By building from a minimal core of shared agreement, researchers should be able to
classify different branches of moral psychology by both subject-matter and method of investigation while
being quietist about the correct methodology. This is turn allows for the construction of a taxonomy of
moral psychological approaches that allows researchers to efficiently locate the direct source of
disagreements. The second chapter examines Lawrence Kohlberg’s research program and identifies a
particular assumption that guides that program while blocking further progress in the field. That
assumption concerns the relation between normative theorizing and descriptive categorization, such that
the explanations for why one moral theory is superior to another mirrors stages of moral development. By
abandoning this assumption and other assumptions in its local vicinity, researchers could make progress
without being bogged down in first-order normative disagreement. The third chapter looks to a recent
debate concerning whether neuroscience is normatively significant. Against a standard interpretation of
the debate in Anglophone philosophy that the argument for the normative insignificance of neuroscience
is sound, I argue that the critique is only partly successful and not for the reasons commonly recognized.
Rather than object to the program of demonstrating the normative significance of neuroscience on
normative grounds, we ought to object to the program on descriptive grounds. Each chapter proceeds
through arguments rooted in philosophical analysis and reflections on findings in the social and natural
sciences – in particular, history, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, cognitive science, and
neuroscience.
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ABSTRACT

THE PROBLEMS OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Thomas Noah
Cristina Bicchieri
This dissertation is a collection of three essays centered around outstanding fundamental
problems in the field of moral psychology. These fundamental problems concern both
metaphysical and methodological disagreements – namely, what is the subject-matter of
moral psychology? And what are the methods for the investigation of that subjectmatter? The first chapter examines the problem of marking the domain of moral
psychology by isolating its subject-matter and the various methodologies for
investigating it. By building from a minimal core of shared agreement, researchers should
be able to classify different branches of moral psychology by both subject-matter and
method of investigation while being quietist about the correct methodology. This is turn
allows for the construction of a taxonomy of moral psychological approaches that allows
researchers to efficiently locate the direct source of disagreements. The second chapter
examines Lawrence Kohlberg’s research program and identifies a particular assumption
that guides that program while blocking further progress in the field. That assumption
concerns the relation between normative theorizing and descriptive categorization, such
that the explanations for why one moral theory is superior to another mirrors stages of
moral development. By abandoning this assumption and other assumptions in its local
vicinity, researchers could make progress without being bogged down in first-order
normative disagreement. The third chapter looks to a recent debate concerning whether
neuroscience is normatively significant. Against a standard interpretation of the debate
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in Anglophone philosophy that the argument for the normative insignificance of
neuroscience is sound, I argue that the critique is only partly successful and not for the
reasons commonly recognized. Rather than object to the program of demonstrating the
normative significance of neuroscience on normative grounds, we ought to object to the
program on descriptive grounds. Each chapter proceeds through arguments rooted in
philosophical analysis and reflections on findings in the social and natural sciences – in
particular, history, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, cognitive science,
and neuroscience.
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PREFACE

This is a collection of essays on moral psychology that critiques the
domain and practice of moral psychology by providing an examination of
outstanding problems in the field. The title is meant to call to mind Bertrand
Russell’s famous The Problems of Philosophy. A relatively short collection, The
Problems of Philosophy finds Russell working on a project wherein he tried to say
something positive and constructive rather than merely negative about what he
took to be some central problems in philosophy (Russell 2001). From this aim, he
largely confined himself to epistemological questions concerning knowledge
rather than metaphysical questions concerning being. But although I mean to
echo both the title and the aim of saying something positive and constructive, my
collection of essays does not sidestep the issue of metaphysical disagreement but
rather centers it. These essays are related less by unity of argumentation than by
unity of concern. The concern is that persistent disagreement in moral
psychology is bad for both theoretical and practical reasons.
Theoretically, this kind of persistent disagreement is troubling but also to
be expected if we accept a general Sellarsian outline that there is an issue of
reconciling the manifest and scientific images of humanity (Sellars 1963). One
way of capturing the basic Sellarsian idea is that we have representations of
ourselves that are of two kinds: we appear as both persons who exist in the
world and act on the basis of intentions and biological creatures with material
constitutions that behave in a world of causes, and there is an tension between
these two images inasmuch as each image does not easily lend itself translatable
in the language of the other. If we accept this overall problematic, then it is
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reasonable to expect that moral psychology is going to be of special interest as a
domain of inquiry, as suggested by Sellars near the end of his essay: that we are
persons with certain ethical standards which can conflict with desires (and,
although Sellars does not say this, other kinds of preferences) and to which we
may not conform must be reconciled with the scientific image of humanity and
human behavior in order for the synoptic response to the problematic to succeed.
Although this collection works in the wake of the Sellarsian problematic,
in that a theme concerns coming up with a naturalistically plausible and
acceptable account of moral psychology that can do justice to the two images, it
is perhaps less optimistic about the proposal to cash out the synoptic vision
through ultimately tendentious normative concepts of rights, duties, and
community intentions. Rather, we start with the aim of showing that many of the
disagreements in moral psychology are in fact not proper to the domain. Once
we realize that, we can see some light toward resolution of local problems. The
approach is piecemeal and does not propose to solve all the problems in one fell
swoop. Rather, we must first diagnose the problems in order to make local
improvements that do not rely on the tendentious antecedent normative
commitments that drive counterproductive disagreement.
But there are practical concerns as well. Philosophers have an obvious
interest in the understanding of the nature, facts about, and possibilities of the
human. Natural and social scientists, governments, NGOs, and other individual
and institutional change agents have an obvious interest in understanding the
causes of human behavior in order to change that behavior. While much work
has been completed on the nature of narrowly self-interested, prudential, and
xv

social norm-related behavior, the domain of moral behavior remains
underdeveloped, at least compared to the relatively robust predictive success in
the other domains in the typology. But we know that moral thinking and
behavior exists. We know that it has profound and pervasive impacts on the
world and the life prospects of human beings, especially on the life prospects of
the least-advantaged persons. Persistent disagreement in moral psychology runs
the risk of the development of a constellation of theories that, while empirically
adequate relative to antecedent normative commitments, is empirically
inadequate with respect to capturing all behavior that is not captured by, for
example, rational choice and game-theoretic analysis. The moral, as such, is
incalcitrant to such analyses, leaving only rival moral theories to provide
guidance in theory choice.
In focusing on the nature of disagreement in the domain of moral
psychology, I have come to the conclusion that much of the disagreement
concerns issues that, in a certain sense, go beyond the realm of pure psychology.
Or rather, the disagreement concerns disagreement, at least in part, over the right
way to conduct psychological investigation of the moral. The other part, in my
view, is fundamental disagreement about the nature of morality itself. Putting
these points together, we can say that the field of moral psychology is riven with
methodological and metaphysical disagreement, where “metaphysical” here
picks out the nature, if any, of moral reality itself.
Here is a fundamental problem in the field of moral psychology: there is
no accepted definition of “moral psychology.” That wouldn’t be too troubling if
there were a more-or-less shared methodology or set of shared methodologies.
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Unfortunately, there isn’t. But even if there were not a shared definition or moreor-less shared methodology, moral psychology wouldn’t be that bad off if there
were agreement about the subject-matter of moral psychology. But, again, there
is not.
I believe that a plausible explanation of these facts – the facts of
disagreement about the subject-matter, definition, and correct methodology of
moral psychology— is that those investigating moral psychology deeply
disagree about the correct account of morality (they disagree metaethically),
about what would be the right or wrong thing to do in some particular
circumstance (they disagree normatively), and about what kinds of explanations
the moral psychologist should offer, in particular with respect to the role of
intuition and theory in explanation (they disagree metaphilosophically). These
disagreements are reflected in the nature of their moral psychologizing.
Because of such disagreements, moral psychology is a fractured discipline,
if it is a unified discipline at all. The largest division, in my view, is between
those working in what I call the humanistic and empirical traditions of moral
psychology. Roughly, the humanistic tradition makes use of a wide range of
methods and evidential sources to come to particular and determinate claims
about moral psychology. In particular, humanists accept as legitimate the
methods of conceptual analysis, intuition pumping, and conceptual genealogy
and are willing to accept a broad range of evidence, including appeals to
philosophical moral theory, emotion, literature, history and the humanities.
Empiricists, on the other hand, are restrictive with respect to both method and
evidence; in particular, they tend toward accepting only the methods of the
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successful natural and social sciences and only the evidence that would counts as
“scientific evidence” within those domains.
The humanist and empiricist traditions split on many important problems
relevant to the domain of moral psychology. Although not fully articulated and
defended only lightly in the collection, there is a broader regulatory ideal of
unifying (in principle) moral psychology by putting forward a method that each
side – humanist and empiricist – could accept. I call this research program
Minimal Moral Psychology. By “minimal moral psychology,” I intend to pick out
a method of interpretation that guarantees to eliminate as much of the
disagreement as possible by deliberately limiting the amount and kind of
metaethical, normative and metaphilosophical inputs allowed in moral
psychology. This method is a method of ideal interpretation and consists of the
application of two principles:
Principle 1: Do not import distinctively moral content into psychological
explanations if there are ready-to-hand non-moral psychological tools that
can explain the phenomena.
and
Principle 2: “[I]dentify an excess of moral content in psychology by
appealing first to what an experienced, honest, subtle, and unoptimistic
interpreter might make of human behavior elsewhere” (Williams 1995).
And, of course, trim the excess.
Together, the principles, when understood properly and acted upon, help solve
the problem of metaethical, normative and metaphilosophical disagreements
driving moral psychological disagreement by calling upon the moral
xviii

psychologist to cull, if possible, the inputs driving the moral psychological
disagreement.
In this collection, I provide three essays that speak to the nature of this
methodological and metaphysical disagreement and trying to offer something
positive and constructive along the way by offering a way to categorize it,
understand at least one of its historical origins, and resolve at least one kind of it.
The first essay provides an understanding of the domain of moral
psychology by attending specifically to certain instances of outstanding
disagreements and using them to organize thought about the subject matter and
definition of the subject. A background guiding principle is that our
understanding of the domain of moral psychology should be generous and
deflationary enough to capture all the parties in these particular disputes while
also being able to separate moral psychology from, say, vision science or
branches of social psychology simpliciter – that is, to say something cognitively
significant while not also using particular tendentious claims to define away the
opposition in these disputes. I argue that there is substantial disagreement about
the definition, subject matter, correct methodology of moral psychology. Most of
the disagreement is moral (normative), metaethical (or metanormative), and
metaphilosophical. We can create a taxonomy of moral psychology along
methodological divides. Moral, metaethical, and metaphilosophical
disagreement drives much of the between-camp and within-camp disagreement - especially between those we can identify as "empiricists" and those as
"humanists."
xix

The second essay tracks a historical origin of at least one source of
persistent disagreement in moral psychology. By focusing on the case of
Lawrence Kohlberg, we can come to see more clearly the danger of tying
particular descriptive accounts to particular normative accounts, and vice versa.
Although many contemporary moral psychologists disavow various parts of his
program or its results, it remains the case Kohlberg has exercised a large
influence on the field of empirical moral psychology. In particular, Kohlberg
assumes that the structures of descriptive moral psychology and normative
ethical theorizing will be isomorphic. I argue that this assumption is optional for
a moral psychologist. Further, because optional, moral psychologists have
freedom to reasonably reject the assumption. Finally, because there also exist
compelling metatheoretical considerations against the assumption, moral
psychologists have at least some reason to consider an alternate paradigm of
moral psychological research centered around the question of how much
substantive moral content ought a researcher allow into their program. A
background idea here is that moral psychology has become balkanized at least in
part because various traditions have built up rival explanations out of the
resources of their preferred normative theories. And given that each may be
“empirically adequate” relative to the antecedent normative commitments at
hand, no tradition has a reason to move from their accounts unless they also
move from their normative commitments, which is unlikely for most
practitioners. If we allow, though, as seems reasonable to me, that descriptive
accounts can constrain normative commitments but that we ought to be wary of
normative commitments constraining the descriptive accounts, then it would be
xx

useful to identify normative commitments that are shared across rival traditions
in order to assess the empirical adequacy of various descriptive accounts on
offer. This is because, in the end, there is no way to do moral psychology but
through partial grounding in moral theory.
The third essay concerns the direct interactions between neuroscience,
psychology, and normative ethics. One current area of dispute is whether
neuroscientific data is normatively significant -- that is, whether we can draw
normative conclusions from neuroscientific evidence. Selim Berker and other
humanists working in the philosophical tradition argue that we cannot, while
Joshua Greene and other empiricists working in the neuroscientific and social
scientific traditions have argued that we can. I argue that both sides are partly
right and partly wrong. Neuroscientific evidence can serve as partial grounding
for normative conclusions in mixed arguments with both normative and
empirical premises, contra Berker. However, we should not think, as Greene and
others think, that any such arguments will eliminate or select potential
candidates for universal morality systems. The debunking will be local -neuroscientific evidence cannot show us that we ought to be classical utilitarians.
This has important implications for research in both the empirical and normative
domains. Empiricists should not think that they can defeat their normative rivals
merely by means of brain data, but normativists should not think that empirical
considerations are wholly irrelevant to figuring out how one ought to live. I
allow, in the end, the high-level normative principles often offered as principles
of right action may, in principle, be immune to empirical evidence, but mid-level
principles must be responsive in order to satisfy a minimal notion of actionxxi

guidance that the overwhelming majority of ethical theories accept as a
constraint on adequate ethical theorizing.
This collection of essays attempts to harmonize conceptual analysis,
thought experiments, social and natural scientific data to a degree that is
respectable in each relative mode of inquiry.
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DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE DOMAIN OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
1

Introduction
The title of this chapter is “Disagreement about the Domain of Moral

Psychology,” and the first conclusion of this chapter is that the domain of moral
psychology is the structure of moral cognition. As such, moral psychology seeks to
provide, in part or in whole, an explanation of the structure or some aspect of the
structure of moral cognition. There are many aspects of the structure of moral
cognition: the psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of moral and
ethical beliefs, judgments, choices, emotions, preferences, motivations, attitudes,
and behaviors; the contents of moral and ethical beliefs, judgments, choices,
emotions, preferences, motivations, and attitudes; the relations between
underpinnings, the relations between contents, and the relations between
underpinnings and contents; the relations between the underpinnings and
contents of moral cognition and other types of cognition, such as rational choice
or social cognition; the presuppositions of different kinds of moral or ethical
thinking; the role of the environment in shaping the individual/group and the
individual/group shaping the environment; and the evolution and history of the
structure of moral cognition. Any work that seeks to provide, in part or in whole,
an explanation of the structure of moral cognition of some aspect of the structure
of moral cognition counts as a work of moral psychology, according to this view.
The second conclusion of this chapter is that given that we accept the
above account of the domain of moral psychology, we should accept a taxonomy
1

of moral psychology that divides categories along methodological lines. There is
no methodology or set of methodologies that is shared by all of those
investigating the structure of moral cognition. Dividing by methodology allows
us to easily identify methodological disagreement. However, within a particular
methodology, there is still substantial disagreement. This within-camp
disagreement is largely normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical. We can
think of each node in the taxonomy as wrapped in normative, metaethical and
metaphilosophical layers. Alternatively, we can think of the taxonomy itself as
wrapped in normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical layers. Regardless,
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical disagreement occurs at each node
in the taxonomy and explains much within-camp disagreement. Because the
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical disagreement of interest is largely
a within-camp phenomenon, it’s useful to have a taxonomy that divides along
methodological lines.
The two conclusions resolve two outstanding problems in the field of
moral psychology: first, “what is the subject matter and definition of moral
psychology?,” and second, “what are the methods someone could use to examine
the subject matter of moral psychology?” Since resolving these two outstanding
problems is important for the field of moral psychology, the two conclusions are
important for the field of moral psychology.
This paper leaves to the side the question, “Which are the good or right or
most useful methods or set of methods someone could use to examine the subject
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matter of moral psychology?” It also leaves to the side the question, “Assuming
that there is some correct methodology, how do we come to know about it?”
The order of the paper is as follows: first, I will review some literature that
suggests that there is disagreement about the definition and subject matter of
moral psychology. I will then offer a fuller treatment of my view that the domain
of moral psychology is the structure of moral cognition and that moral
psychology seeks to provide, in part or in whole, an explanation of the structure
or some aspect of the structure of moral cognition. I then provide a sketch of a
taxonomy based upon different methods someone could use to explain the
aspects of the structure of moral cognition. I explain the taxonomy and argue
that it is useful for diagnosing between-camp and within-camp disputes. At the
same time, there are some moral psychologists who have mixed methodologies
or who occupy more than one camp at a time. The methodological taxonomy can
also explain how their work differs from closely related work that does not cross
camps.
2

What is the subject matter and definition of moral psychology?
One of the major problems in moral psychology is that there is deep

disagreement about what counts as 'moral psychology.' The aim of this section is
to say what counts as ‘moral psychology’ by describing the domain of moral
psychology and then defining “moral psychology” in such a way that it offers
explanations of target phenomena in the domain of moral psychology.

3

2.1

Revision of Original Method
In a previous version of this paper that I presented as a talk to the

Dissertation Seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, I contrasted two ways of
defining “moral psychology.” One way to divide the sheep from the goats (moral
psychology from something else) is to begin with a top-down definition of
"moral psychology." Call this "Fiat Method." An alternative strategy is to observe
what people who claim to do moral psychology actually do and to theorize about
the relations between these different practices. Call this "Geographical Method."
These methods roughly correspond to the difference between conceptualanalytic and social practice accounts of a particular domain of inquiry. I argued
that the Geographical Method was a better way of defining “moral psychology”
because I thought the method was less tendentious and less open to
disagreement than the Fiat Method. I also thought the Geographical Method was
useful inasmuch as it points our attention toward the actual practices of people
who claim to do moral psychology, and such facts, I claimed, were pretty
important in thinking about moral psychology.
This distinction between these two methods is ultimately futile, although
there is something important that the distinction aims to capture. What is
ultimately futile about the distinction is that the Geographical Method is, at
bottom, itself a Fiat Method, inasmuch as all strategies for definition rely upon
operationalization of terms. All definitions are “top-down” in this sense, and
there is no meaningful distinction between Fiat and Geographical Methods in
how I previously described the methods. That said, there is an important
4

difference between defining “moral psychology” in terms of one’s preferred
approach to moral psychology and defining “moral psychology” in terms of
practices related to the domain of moral psychology. The former is too exclusive,
depending on what one’s preferred approach to moral psychology is. But the
1

latter doesn’t strike me as too exclusive or inclusive: it hits a Goldilocks standard
in terms of scope by limiting the account to observable behavior and practice.
That said, my original formulation was incomplete and open to
misunderstandings. In the original formulation, I attempted to sidestep the issue
of specifying the target domain of moral psychology. I thought that I could
sidestep the issue since I could identify the target domain downstream; in
particular, I thought that by appealing to the practices of people who claim to do
moral psychology, I could then, from those practices, identify the subject-matter
of moral psychology and that such identification would be protected from
standard objections to domain specification. I was wrong.
There are a couple of objections that arise in response to a proposal like
that of my original approach, and most of these objections are rooted in the fact
that such an approach doesn’t specify individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for membership that would exclude prima facie absurdities.
So, even though objections based on rhetorical questions such as, “Is my bowling

For me to define “moral psychology” in terms of my preferred approach to
moral psychology would make me almost certainly have to rule out many
practices that I had wanted to call “moral psychology.”
1
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ball moral psychology?” are, strictly speaking, non-sequiturs, there are related
2

issues. Namely, my previous account, the one not tied to a subject-matter, didn’t
suitably restrict moral psychology because it allowed that moral psychology is (i)
what people who claim to do morally psychology actually do and (ii) the
relations between those practices. But, moral psychologists do lots of things –
they brush their teeth, they listen to trap music, they study chemistry, and so on.
So it is insufficient to say that moral psychology is what people who claim to do
moral psychology actually do, for people who claim to do moral psychology
actually brush their teeth, but no one thinks that brushing your teeth is moral
psychology.

3

Because of this, I have come to realize that I must say something about the
subject-matter of moral psychology in order to fruitfully address the question,
“what is moral psychology?” We need to restrict the range of activities that
moral psychologists actually do that are relevant for picking out moral
psychology as a field. We could try the strategy of saying that moral psychology
is the stuff people who claim to do moral psychology do when they claim to do
moral psychology. This again allows objections from deviant cases and

Because the point was never “moral psychology is whatever people who claim
to do moral psychology claim to be.” Basically, the “bowling ball objection” only
would work on the condition that my account was meant to say, “if a person
who claims to do moral psychology claims to be some X, then moral psychology
is also that X,” and if it were true that there were some individual who both
claimed to do moral psychology and to be a bowling ball. I assume such a person
doesn’t exist. The point was “moral psychology is whatever people who claim to
do moral psychology actually do.”
I owe part of this line of questioning to Daniel J. Singer and Andrew McAninch.
2

3

6

absurdities. I see no way to avoid these objections but to specify the domain and
4

subject matter of moral psychology. Importantly, though, this doesn’t mean that
I’ve given up on all of the original approach. Rather, we must integrate the
practices of people who claim to do moral psychology with an account of the
domain and subject matter of moral psychology into our definition of “moral
psychology,” and we’ll have to do so in a more or less holistic way, even though
the subject-matter of moral psychology is given some explanatory priority in
marking out what counts as moral psychology.
2.2

Popular Conceptions of Moral Psychology
What is the subject matter and definition of moral psychology?

Thankfully, like many questions of this sort, we do not have to start at the barest
of philosophical intuitions and work our way up or deduce our way down from
there. Instead, there is a history of practices aimed at providing explanations in
the target domain of moral psychology. And sometimes the practitioners have
provided definitions of moral psychology that we can now evaluate. In what is to
follow, I will present a series of definitions of moral psychology that have
popped up among those aiming at providing explanations in the target domain
of moral psychology. This series is not exhaustive, but it is meant to illustrate

For example, we could have a deviant case where a person claim to do moral
psychology performs some behavior and calls that behavior moral psychology,
but we simply wouldn’t want to say that it’s moral psychology. But the deviant
who claims to do moral psychology and claims that snapping his fingers 13 times
before leaving the room counts as “moral psychology” isn’t doing moral
psychology. He’s doing some other, bizarre thing.
4
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important continuities and discontinuities between rival conceptions of moral
psychology.
In the introduction to their collection Moral Psychology: Historical and
Contemporary Readings (2010), Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias and Shaun
Nichols write:
Moral psychology is the field that addresses these and related issues – it is
the study of the way humans think about morality, make moral
judgments, and behave in moral situations. While the immediate goal of
the field is to understand moral cognition and behavior, the inquiry also
has possible implications for how we should make moral judgments and
how we should behave. Even though we cannot move directly from data
concerning how we actually do think and behave to theories about how
we ought to think and behave, by exploring morality in an
interdisciplinary way, moral psychologists are, at a minimum, able to
place empirical constraints on normative theorizing. Moral psychology
thus involves the intersection of philosophy and empirical sciences
ranging from evolutionary biology and game theory to neuroscience and
social psychology. (p. 1)
“These issues” that moral psychology addresses as a field are
What is it about human beings that enables (or compels) us to engage in
such complicated moral thought and behavior [e.g., non-reciprocal
altruism and moral debate]? What biological and psychological capacities
8

underlie our moral judgments? What drives us to help those in need?
What enables us to follow moral norms and to be responsible for
transgressing them? (p. 1)
Nadelhoffer, Nahmias and Nichols capture important features of moral
psychology in their definition, even if we may wonder about some of their
particular details of their account. Taken in a suitably broad way, it is
5

undeniably true that moral psychology has the subject matter of “the way
humans think about morality, make moral judgments, and behave in moral
situations.” A complaint about this way of talking is that it is far too coarsegrained to be informative beyond the obvious platitude that moral psychology is
about morality and psychology (allowing that psychology is about thinking and
behavior). But this complaint is lessened in view of the questions that moral
psychology addresses as a field. To take one example, what is it about us human
beings that enables or compels us to engage in moral debate? This is an example
that begins to flesh out the subject matter of moral psychology in a way that says
something non-trivial and important about moral psychology. We can
investigate the question from cognitive scientific or sociological points of views,
and what we have to investigate is a particular aspect of the structure of moral
cognition.
For example, if moral psychology has “possible implications” for ethics and
ethical theory, then the best they can say is that, at a minimum, moral
psychologists only possibly are able to place empirical constraints on normative
theorizing. And the claim that “moral psychology thus involves the intersection
of philosophy and empirical sciences” doesn’t follow from “by exploring
morality in an interdisciplinary way, moral psychologists are, at a minimum,
able to place empirical constraints on normative theorizing.” But I set these
issues to the side for the sake of discussion.
5
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2.3

Three Fundamental Disagreements

Disagreement 1: Is the interface of empirical psychology and normative ethics a topic in
moral psychology?
Another important feature of Nadelhoffer, Nahmias and Nichols’s
definition is that it incorporates normative ethical theorizing (or at least
implications for normative ethical theorizing in the form of “constraints”) into
the field of moral psychology. Another way to put the point is that, according to
them, the interface of what we might call “empirical moral psychology” and
normative ethical theorizing is itself part of the subject matter of moral
psychology.
This view has support among other contemporary moral psychologists.
So, for example, John Doris writes in the introduction to The Moral Psychology
Handbook (2010) that for moral psychology, times lately have been both
interesting and good: research at the intersection of human mentation and
human morality is flourishing as never before” and that “the discipline of moral
psychology is, as the name intimates, a hybrid inquiry, informed both by ethical
theory and psychological fact” (p. 1). Or consider the account offered by Doris
and Stephen Stich in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article “Moral
Psychology: Empirical Approaches” (2017):
Moral psychology investigates human functioning in moral contexts, and
asks how these results may impact debate in ethical theory. This work is
necessarily interdisciplinary, drawing on both the empirical resources of
10

the human sciences and the conceptual resources of philosophical ethics.”
(par. 1).
These all suggest that “moral psychology” is not (or not only) what contemporary
psychologists in departments of psychology at universities do when working on
explanations of the causal and computational structure of moral cognition.
But not all investigators agree that moral psychology includes the
interface of empirical moral psychology and normative ethical theorizing. For
example, Regina Rini (2015) argues that moral psychology is about the causal
and computational structures of the human moral faculty. This suggests to me
6

that she thinks that the interface of moral psychology and normative ethical
theorizing is not itself part of moral psychology. This investigation of the
interface would belong to a branch of philosophy, perhaps moral philosophy or
metaphilosophy. And we can draw upon many examples of moral philosophers
– from Kant (1998) to many contemporary Anglo-American or “analytic”
philosophers – who think that empirically-oriented moral psychology (one of the
two aspects of moral psychology in the Nadelhoffer, Nahmias, and Nichols and
Doris, Doris and Stich lines) is largely or completely irrelevant to the practice of
normative ethical theorizing. For example, Selim Berker (2009) argues in “The
Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience” that

It is true that Rini qualifies her statements so that it is about “empirical moral
psychology,” which leaves open the possibility that there is a non-empirical
moral psychology. But, later in her article, she slides between empirical
psychology and psychology when making her claims about the causal structure
of the human moral faculty.
6
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[E]ither attempts to derive normative implications from these
neuroscientific results rely on a shoddy inference, or they appeal to
substantive normative intuitions (usually about what sorts of features are
or are not morally relevant) that render the neuroscientific results
irrelevant to the overall argument. (p. 294)
What is animating Berker’s position here is that the interface of empirical moral
psychology – at least neuroscientific versions of empirical moral psychology –
and normative ethical theorizing is a subject in philosophy and not in moral
psychology.

7

So we have disagreement between those investigating moral psychology.
Some think that moral psychology includes the interface of empirical moral
psychology and normative theorizing, and others disagree.
Disagreement 2: Must moral psychology make use of the resources of philosophical
ethics?
But this is not the only disagreement. Again, the
Nadelhoffer/Nahmias/Nichols, Doris, and Doris/Stich accounts claim that
moral psychology is an interdisciplinary field and that one of the relevant
disciplines is philosophical ethics itself. But there are some people working on
moral psychology who do not make use of the resources of philosophical ethics
and who would typically eschew such resources. The reasons for avoiding the
I interpret this quote as saying that attempts to lay the groundwork for the
interface fall prey to bad epistemological practice. The interface is a proper
subject of logic, philosophy of science, and epistemology. The proper
(philosophical) view is that there’s no such interface.
7
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resources of philosophical ethics are varied: perhaps the resources aren’t
vouchsafed in the right way, or perhaps the resources are not properly
“empirical,” or perhaps the resources can’t be falsified or whatever the standard
(and that the resources can’t be falsified or whatever constitutes an obstacle to
making use of the resources).
For example, Cristina Bicchieri does work on what is recognizably
“empirical moral psychology,” but she does not make use of the resources of
philosophical ethics. Bicchieri’s theory of social norms is a system of
classification of characteristic motivations of collective patterns of behavior (2006,
2016). Using traditional concepts associated with game-theoretic analysis and
rational choice theory (such as ‘preference’ and ‘belief,’ she distinguishes
between customs, descriptive norms, social norms, and moral norms. According
to Bicchieri, moral norms are a subset of personal norms, and personal norms are
marked by an unconditional preference to act in accord with the norm. This is in
8

contrast to unilateral and multilateral descriptive norms and social norms, where
the preference to act in accordance with the norm is conditional on empirical
expectations that relevant others act in accordance with the norm or conditional
on empirical expectations plus normative expectations. Normative expectations
are beliefs about other people’s beliefs about what you should or what should be
done. Behavior in compliance with moral norms is grounded in personal
normative belief, a first-order belief of the form “I think I/you/they/us should
do X.”
Habits, customs and moral norms are all instances of personal norms, according
to Bicchieri’s 2006 account.
8
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Bicchieri’s 2006 treatment of moral norms and moral norm compliance is
the least developed treatment of any of the collective patterns of behavior that
she examines. But, in laying out her partial theory of moral norms, Bicchieri does
not seem to call upon the resources of philosophical ethics. Now, it’s true that
there is a tradition in philosophical ethics that maintains that moral norms issue
unconditional demands, and there is a philosophical ethical tradition that says
that when a person makes a moral judgment, then, ceteris paribus, that person is
motivated to act on the judgment regardless of what she perceives others to think
of her moral judgment. But Bicchieri makes the distinction between moral norms
and, say, social norms not on the basis of philosophical ethics but rather on the
basis of the belief/preference model from rational choice theory and the concept
of interdependent choice from game theory. And there is no part of her account
that implies the motivational internalism from the philosophical ethical tradition,
as it remains possible (and in many cases of sufficient social pressure, likely) that
individuals with not act in order with the moral belief that they happen to hold
with respect to some behavioral rule. This is why, I think, this account has
difficulty separating habits/customs from moral norms. So, for example,
Bicchieri (2006) writes
Condition 2 (the conditional preference condition) marks an important
distinction between social and personal norms, whether they are habits or
have moral force. Take the habit of brushing my teeth every morning. I
find it sanitary, and I like the taste of mint toothpaste. Even if I came to
realize that most people stopped brushing their teeth, I would continue to
14

do so, because I have independent reasons for doing it. It is likewise with
moral norms: I have good, independent reasons to avoid killing people I
deeply dislike. Even if I were to find myself in a Hobbesian state of nature,
without rules or rights, I would still feel repugnance and anguish at the
idea of taking a life. With this I do not mean to suggest that moral norms
are a world apart from other rules. Instead, by their very nature, moral
norms demand (at least in principle) an unconditional commitment. (20)
Both habits and moral norms are motivated by unconditional commitments (that
is, unconditional on what I expect others to do or believe), and we can express
this fact by noting that habits and moral norms are each grounded in (good)
independent reasons. Still, Bicchieri says that our motivational profile toward
9

the collective behavior or rule of behavior determines whether we are dealing
with moral norms or social norms, not our stereotypical justifications of the
behavior that we would attempt to give. But most moral philosophers, especially
working in the wake of 20 century metaethics that try to separate morality from
th

other normative domains such as prudence or etiquette, and, although this is
specuation, most ordinary non-philosophers explicitly avow that habits or
I think that there is a problem here with the introduction of “good” before
“independent reasons to avoid killing people I deeply dislike.” It makes sense to
say that I have good, independent reason to brush my teeth. Since I value my
overall health, it is instrumentally rational and good for me to brush my teeth.
But “good” doesn’t seem to function in the same way in the imagined moral case.
It may not be instrumentally rational of me not to kill people I dislike in a
Hobbesian environment. So I don’t know what Bicchieri means here. “Good” in
the case of habit clearly picks out “good for me,” and in some sense over and
above “good for me in the sense that I think the reasons are morally good.”
People sometimes express that that have good moral reason to do such-and-such,
even though doing such-and-such would be “bad” for them on all but the most
ascetic readings of “bad for you.”
9
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matters of prudence are different than moral norms, even though both demand
“unconditional commitment” in the sense that Bicchieri employs the term. If
10

Bicchieri were drawing upon the resources of philosophical ethics, then she
should be able to cleanly separate habits from moral norms in line with the
philosophical tradition and ordinary understanding. Therefore we can conclude
that she is not drawing upon the resources of philosophical ethics.

11

So far, we have two disputes about the subject matter and definition of
moral psychology. First, some think that moral psychology includes the interface
of empirical moral psychology and normative theorizing, and others disagree.
Second, some think that moral psychology, perhaps regardless of interface
issues, requires the conceptual resources of philosophical ethics, and other
disagree. I want to turn now to one final point of dispute.
Dispute 3: Should moral psychology be examined in an empirical or humanistic way?
This point of dispute is a growing issue, and I think that it highlights
something important about moral psychology. Remember that we are examining
accounts that maintain that moral psychology is a hybrid theory of ethical theory
and psychological fact. The “psychological facts” here correspond to the facts as
given by empirical investigations into moral thinking and behavior. But there are
some people who think that there is a distinctly philosophical moral psychology that
Or at least our (moral philosophers’ and perhaps many of the folks’) concepts
“habit” and “moral norm” are clearly different.
Of course, this assumes that rational choice theories are not examples of
philosophical ethics. I would be willing to consider treating the theories as
ethical theories; in such a case, I would need an alternative example of my point
here.
10
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can be contrasted with empirical moral psychology, and they think that
philosophical moral psychology is superior to much empirical moral psychology
(or is a necessary supplement to empirical moral psychology in order to curb its
excesses). The question here is whether moral psychology belongs to the
empirical sciences. Some say yes, and others disagree.
A couple of examples here should suffice. Carla Bagnoli (2011) identifies
the dispute between empirically-oriented moral psychology – of the sort
practiced by Stich, Doris and other people who are members of or who are
influenced by the Moral Psychology Research Group – and what I’ve called
above “philosophical moral psychology. She writes:
In contrast to this empirical approach to philosophy and psychology,
others argue that both disciplines are autonomous with respect to the
cognitive sciences. [Here she cites Bernard Williams and R. Jay Wallace as
exemplars] Of course, empirical findings may be indirectly relevant to
philosophical arguments. . . Even if they recognize that a dialogue with
the empirical sciences is inevitable and rewarding, these philosophers
argue that it is misleading to think of the activity of philosophy as
modeled on the empirical sciences. At issue, then, is not science, but
‘scientism’, [sic] or the philosophical view that assimilates philosophy to
science and borrows its methods. (p 13)
Bagnoli goes on to discuss how the issue turns on the issue of moral motivation
and how many analyses of moral motivation depend, in part, on a priori methods
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of analysis. We see this sort of issue pop up when moral philosophers talk about
empirical treatments of, say, altruism and altruistic behavior. The empirical
psychologist or philosopher offers some operationalized sense of “altruism” and
“altruistic behavior” that is testable and allows for measurement. The moral
philosopher says, “You’ve missed important part P of altruism (typically, a
characteristic of the motivation). Your operationalization is bad, you’ve missed
the target phenomena, and your results don’t show what you claim that the
show.”
In order to demonstrate that this is a real phenomena, one could look at
the vast literature comprising Humean, Kantian, Aristotelian, and Thomist
theories of moral motivation and see how they rely upon a priori and normative
methods that sharply distinguish the moral from the non-moral. For a particular
case in point, we could look at Lawrence Blum’s criticisms of Shaun Nichols’s
sentimental rules account of moral cognition. Blum (2011) lays out his complaints
at length:
I will argue that Nichols’s view suffers from several deficiencies: (1) It
operates with an impoverished view of the altruistic emotions (empathy,
sympathy, concern, compassion, etc.) as mere short-term, affective states
of mind, lacking any essential connection to intentionality, perception,
cognition, and expressiveness. (2) He fails to keep in focus the moral
distinction between two very different kinds of emotional response to the
distress and suffering of others – other-directed, altruistic emotions that
have moral value, and self-directed emotional responses, such as personal
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distress, that do not. (3) Nichols is correct to see morality as requiring
affectivity, the capability of emotional response to others; but his incorrect
view of altruistic emotions (and of emotions in general) leads him to
misstate the connection between morality and emotion. (4) Nichols fails to
recognize Schopenhauer’s form of anti-rationalism as distinct from
Humean sentimentalism; some of his arguments presented to support the
latter instead lend support to the former. (5) Finally, while agreeing that
moral philosophy is strengthened by knowledge of empirical psychology,
I suggest that the foregoing failures of Nichols’s argument are partly due
to his misuse of particular empirical results and findings, his being overenamored of empirical psychology, and possibly to a weakened
commitment to the distinctive contribution that the humanistic methods
of philosophy make to our understanding of the moral enterprise. (p. 171)
Blum’s disagreement with Nichols’s is as complete as I could wish for in an
example, and Blum’s criticisms of Nichols perfectly encapsulate the divide
between empirical and humanistic or philosophical modes of moral psychology.
Blum argues that Nichols mischaracterizes altruism, that Nichols too readily
relies on empirical rather than analytic accounts of altruistic motivation, that
Nichols has a generally impoverished view of emotions due to ready reliance on
empirical psychology, that Nichols fails to respect the history of philosophical
theory (especially philosophical theory with respect to moral psychology, and
that Nichols’s failures are related to his metaphilosophical attitudes. This is not
to say that I endorse Blum’s criticisms, nor is it to say that I reject them. The
19

criticisms, as such, are orthogonal to the point that I’m trying to make. The point
that I’m trying to make is that Blum and Nichols substantially disagree about the
correct methodology and the role of the experimental method and empirical data
in choosing between rival accounts in moral psychology.
So, to summarize, there is substantial disagreement about whether the
interface of empirical moral psychology and normative ethical theorizing is a
subject in moral psychology, there is disagreement about whether doing moral
psychology requires taking on the conceptual resources of normative ethical
theory, and there is disagreement about whether we should investigate moral
psychology with the tools of experimental psychology, of traditional
philosophical analysis, or of some combination thereof. These disagreements
amount to disagreements about the subject matter, definition and methodology
of moral psychology. If that’s true, then I think that we should look for an
understanding of moral psychology that locates these disputes as within the field
of moral psychology.
3

The domain of moral psychology is the structure of moral cognition
As I said previously, I think that one way to get traction in thinking about

the definition is to think about the domain of moral psychology. I’ve also said
that the domain of moral psychology is the structure of moral cognition. And
I’ve said that the structure of moral cognition has the following aspects: the
psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of moral and ethical
beliefs, judgments, choices, emotions, preferences, motivations, attitudes, and
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behaviors; the contents of moral and ethical beliefs, judgments, choices,
emotions, preferences, motivations, and attitudes; the relations between
underpinnings, the relations between contents, and the relations between
underpinnings and contents; the relations between the underpinnings and
contents of moral cognition and other types of cognition, such as rational choice
or social cognition; the presuppositions of different kinds of moral or ethical
thinking; the role of the environment in shaping the moral and ethical beliefs of
the individual/group and the individual/group, from those moral and ethical
beliefs, shaping the environment; and the evolution and history of the structure
of moral cognition.
This understanding of the domain of moral psychology is, I believe,
consistent with what how the people I’ve talked about so far think about the
domain of moral psychology. Granted, I have specified the domain in greater
detail than merely talking about moral thinking and more behavior. I have
broken down “thinking” into components like “beliefs,” “judgments,” “choices,”
“emotions,” “preferences,” “motivations,” and “attitudes.” I have separated the
discussion of the cognitive and neurophysiological underpinnings of these acts
of moral thinking from their contents, and I’ve deliberately left “underpinnings”
and “contents” open so as to be able to capture substantive disputes about what
counts as an “underpinning” or as a “content.” My characterization of the
structure of moral cognition is in principle consistent with both sides of the three
disagreements that I’ve listed before as fundamental disagreements. The
structure of moral cognition is the target phenomena that researchers in moral
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psychology are after, and many of the people listed above have some substantial
disagreement about some aspect of the structure of moral cognition. So, for
example, debates about where to locate the interface of empirical moral
psychology and normative ethical theorizing take different aspects of the
structure of moral cognition as salient and then advance substantive positions
about those aspects. The salient aspect, for one theorist, could be the relation
between the underpinnings and the contents of moral psychology; for another, it
could be about merely the contents of moral psychology. It doesn’t really matter
for our purposes whether we think that the interface is a subject in empirical
moral psychology or normative ethical theorizing – if it’s part of empirical moral
psychology, then it’s a part of the structure of moral cognition, and if it’s part of
normative ethical theorizing, then it’s also a part of the structure of moral
cognition (in virtue of the fact that moral psychology seeks to explain the
contents of particular moral judgments as well as specifying the casual and
computational structure of the human moral faculty).
If this characterization of the structure of moral cognition has a “heads, I
win, and tails, you lose” quality to it, do keep in mind that the characterization
rules out a lot as possibly being the subject matter of moral psychology. Set
theory is not part of the subject matter of moral psychology nor is non-organic
chemistry nor is brushing your teeth nor is social norm theory, except inasmuch
as these items can become the content of particular moral judgments. There is a
universe of not-moral psychology. With that said, it’s not an objection to my
account of the structure of moral cognition that lots of people talking about
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moral psychology are doing moral psychology when they do the sorts of things I
was describing them as doing. It’s a feature, and not a bug, of the system that
those I’ve mentioned before are all doing moral psychology.
4

The Definition and a Taxonomy of Moral Psychology
But, from this first approximation as to the structure of moral cognition,

we get a principled way to define “moral psychology.” The definition is that
moral psychology seeks to provide, in part or in whole, an explanation of the
structure or some aspect of the structure of moral cognition. This definition is
principled because we have defined a target class of phenomena that is of
cognitive significance. We want to know about those aspects of the structure of
moral cognition, and moral psychology is the field that attempts to provide
partial or complete explanations of aspects of or all of the structure of moral
cognition. If you are not trying to provide partial or complete explanations of
aspects of or all of the structure of moral cognition, then you are not doing moral
psychology. Alternatively, we do not call you a “moral psychologist.”
From the definition of “moral psychology,” we could devise a taxonomy
that breaks down according to which aspect or aspects of the structure of moral
cognition that the theorist is trying to explain. I think that this results in a
needlessly complicated schema, and the needless complication gets in the way of
any true utility that the schema could provide. Rather, all that we need for the
purpose of categorization are methodologies. We assume in the taxonomy that
we have already antecedently addressed which aspect of the structure of moral
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cognition we want to investigate. Then, we can ask, “What are the methodologies
that we could use to investigate this subject matter.” Here is where attention to
the practices of extant moral psychology because useful again. Although
explanatory priority is given to the structure of moral cognition, we cannot
ignore the practices of moral psychology if we wish to diagnose primary areas of
dispute. We can provide a methodological division according to different styles
of explanation, assuming that there are multiple styles and that causal
explanations are not the only sorts of explanation. Then, within a methodological
division, we can identify within-camp disagreement by invoking substantive
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical positions. I want to diagnose
primary points of methodological and substantive dispute, and any
representation that allows such a diagnosis and that is clear and perspicuous is
acceptable from my perspective.
5

The Methodological Taxonomy
Given that moral psychology is the field that seeks to provide, in part or in

whole, an explanation of the structure or some aspect of the structure of moral
cognition, then it makes sense to distinguish among kinds of moral psychology
by the characteristic types of explanation that the kinds would give.
In my taxonomic sketch, we can distinguish between humanistic,
empirical and theological types of explanation. I’ve already gone part way
toward distinguishing between humanistic and empirical types of explanation.
Empirical types of explanation rely upon the scientific method generally and the
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methods of the successful natural and social science more specifically to provide
explanations of whatever aspect of the structure of moral cognition is under
consider. Many people grant that the aspect of the structure of moral cognition
concerning the psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of aspects
of moral thinking and behavior either require or are enhanced by means of
empirical explanations.

12

But some people don’t grant that theological explanations count as
genuine explanations, or they don’t grant that theological explanations are
autonomous from humanistic explanations more generally. To the first, I reply
that positing a moral sense implanted by a deity is a potential explanation. It’s
not a very good explanation, but, if it were true that a deity implanted a moral
sense in humans, then you could potentially explain some aspects of the
structure of moral cognition in terms of your proposed theology. To the second, I
reply that humanistic explanations are different in kind from theological
explanations. Let me explain by talking more about what I think constitute
humanistic explanations.
I think that humanistic explanation come in three primary modes:
normative, phenomenological and historical/genealogical. These methods try to
explain aspects of the structure of moral cognition, but they don’t do so through
the methods of the successful natural and social sciences or through the methods
peculiar to particular theological commitments. Humanistic modes of
The neurophysiological must be carried out in empirical fashion. There is no
humanistic or theological tradition of explanation that even begins to account for
such underpinnings.
12
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explanation are pitched at the level of interpretations of the human being as
beings in the natural world. There is a fundamental explanatory difference
between positing a faculty of pure practical reason (which would count as
“humanistic” under my schema) and positing a moral analogue of a sensus
divinitatis (which obviously would count as “theological”).

13

Under the humanistic tradition, which I’ve previously identified with
Blum and which Bagnoli identified with Williams, Wallace and the Humean,
Kantian, Aristotelian and Scholastic theories of moral motivation, we can identify
people who are attempting to explain aspects of the structure of moral cognition
by reference to explicit normative theories (“normative”), by reference to the
phenomenology of lived moral experience (“philosophical” and “literary”
versions – the distinction here is a genre distinction, but it’s also related to the
explicitly articulated phenomenological theory), and by reference to historicalgenealogical accounts that seek to vindicate or deflate confidence in held belief
[for example, (Nietzsche 1989), (Foucault 1977) and Williams’s (2002) on the
multifarious uses of genealogical method).
Against the theological and humanistic traditions, we identify the
empirical tradition, and we subdivide according to the venerable distinction in
the philosophy of social science between methodological individualism, holism
and mixed approaches. Individualist approaches seek to explain collective
patterns of behavior by reducing the phenomena to patterns of interlocking
individual behavior within certain boundary constraints. Holist approaches seek
13

I thank Devin Curry for this point.
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to explain individual behavior in terms of social entities, institutions, or
phenomena that are in some sense more than the aggregate of individual choice.
Mixed methods mix and match according to the particular subject matter.
What is useful about this taxonomy is that it allows us to identify points of
dispute between, say, Thomists, Blum and Nichols. We can say that they are all
doing moral psychology, but they disagree with respect to method.
Importantly, the schema also allows us to identify when people are
mixing methods. So, for example, Duke Naturalists make simultaneous use of
historical-genealogical and empirical methods. We can track that Wong (2009)
and others are doing this, and we can separate them from folks who are merely
doing one or the other style of explanation. Or, for another example, many
Christian moral psychologists of late antiquity combined literary, historicalgenealogical, and theological methods {for example, see (Augustine 1998). Again,
the schema tells us about possible methodologies; it doesn’t tell us which
methodology is right or which methods are the good or reliable or useful
methods. I will say that I think that it is a function of one’s normative,
metaethical and metaphilosophical commitments whether one is likely to mix
and match methodology, although I will not explicitly argue for that here. It is
enough to say that mixed methodologies don’t need any special place within the
taxonomy, for we have all the components necessary for explaining in what ways
a particular mixed methodology happens to be mixed.
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But still, there is within-camp disagreement that is also important to
account for. The rings or layers of normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical
commitment allow us to do just that. We can identify points of within-camp
dispute – such as the dispute between Joshua Greene (2008) and John Mikhail
(2008) at the level of individualist empirical moral psychology – as largely arising
out of normative and metaethical disagreement. They disagree, for example,
about whether it would be right to push the fat man in the bridge version of the
trolley problem. They also disagree about what the correct account of morality is
more generally. But they mostly agree on the correct methodology for the
investigation of the psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of
moral thinking – they are both using the methods of cognitive science.
To add some further content to the bare sketch: John Doris (2002) and
Gilbert Harman (1999) argue that social psychological research shows that there
are no robust character traits as assumed and required by contemporary virtue
ethical theories, Sharon Street (2006) argues that Darwinian evolution
undermines claims that our psychology is adapted to perceive robustly mindindependent moral facts, and Joshua Greene and many others (2001) argue that
there is compelling psychological and neuroscientific evidence that
characteristically utilitarian judgments are reason-based (in some interesting
way) while characteristically deontological and virtue ethical judgments are
emotion-based (in some interesting way).
Of course, there are others working at the same level in the taxonomy and
who dispute these claims. So, Rachana Kamtekar (2004), Daniel Russell (2009),
28

Nancy Snow (2010) and many others argue that Doris and Harman’s complaints
are overblown and that character traits have respectable scientific credentials and
that social psychology is consistent with normative virtue ethics. David Copp
(2008) and others have argued that Darwinian evolution poses no problem for
their versions of naturalistic moral realism. And John Mikhail (2011), Fiery
Cushman (2013) and others have argued that characteristically deontological
judgments are wholly or partly constituted by cognitive appraisals.
These disputes are largely normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical.
Our taxonomy should allow space for these disagreements and account for them.
This is not a full account of the ways in which normative, metaethical and
metaphilosophical commitments drive within-camp moral psychological
disagreement, but it is an introduction. Fuller articulation of this view will
depend on the fuller articulation of a method of separating normative and nonnormative content so that we can be in a position to reliably identify points of
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical dispute. However, we have a
general sense of what we’re up to, and I see no in principle objection to this line
of inquiry.
6

Conclusion
I have offered an account of the domain of moral psychology that

identifies it as the structure of moral cognition. I spent quite a deal of time
explaining how there is disagreement about the definition of “moral
psychology.” I argued that the identification of the domain of moral psychology
29

with the structure of moral cognition was principled and consistent with
prevailing attitudes. I then argued that the identification gives us a principled
basis for defining moral psychology as the field that seeks to provide, in part or
in whole, an explanation of the structure or some aspect of the structure of moral
cognition. I then gave a very brief taxonomic sketch about alternative methods of
explanation of aspects of the structure of moral cognition.
What we need to develop going forward is a more fully articulated
account that shows how the methodological taxonomy interlocks the aspects of
the structure of moral cognition such that certain aspects of the structure of
moral cognition are more amenable to certain styles of explanation. For now, it
suffices to say that I have specified the domain of moral psychology, provided a
working definition for “moral psychology” on the basis of that domain
specification, and presented a first-pass taxonomy of positions in moral
psychology by dividing along methodological lines. Showing how the
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical layers work in the picture require
more work and is outside the scope of the present discussion.
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MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, NOT MORALIZED PSYCHOLOGY: REFLECTIONS
ON KOHLBERG

1

Introduction

Our psychological theory as to why moral development is upward and
sequential is broadly the same as our philosophical justification for claiming that a
higher stage is more adequate or more moral than a lower stage.
-Lawrence Kohlberg (1971)

14

The fit between the special psychological conception and the demands of
morality enables us to see that this piece of psychology is itself a moral
conception, and one that shares notably doubtful features of that particular
morality itself.
-Bernard Williams (1995a)

15

Lawrence Kohlberg jumpstarted the modern experimental turn in moral
psychology. And, even though many empirically-oriented moral psychologists
16

P. 180-81.
P. 74.
I stress the “modern” here because there is an experimentalist tradition in moral
psychology dating back to Aristotle and running through to Hume and the
sentimentalist traditions, to Spencer and the evolutionary traditions, and to
Dewey and the classical pragmatist tradition. In point of fact, Kohlberg thinks of
himself as traveling in Dewey’s wake, armed with certain methods adapted from
Piaget (1971, p. 154). But, given that Kohlberg’s work on morality is probably
more read than Dewey’s at this point, I see nothing especially problematic about
my ascription. Regardless, I take Kohlberg’s work – and his assumption about
the relation of descriptive and normative practices in moral psychology – to be
symptomatic of a larger trend. Given that Kohlberg still serves as a shared point of
reference for those working in moral psychology, I hope that by starting with
him we can recognize a strain of thinking that continues to today.
14
15
16
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now believe that Kohlberg’s theory was wrong in one way or many, his influence
stills extends throughout the community.

17

One of his legacies, though, has been stronger than any other: Kohlberg
was explicit that he was attempting to tether tightly an account of moral
development and moral cognition to an account of moral epistemology and
metaethics. What this meant for Kohlberg was that any adequate explanation of
the psychological mechanisms that produce behavior identified as “moral”
would be broadly the same as any adequate justification of certain principles or
modes of reasoning as moral. Kohlberg (1971) provides some further clarification
as to what counts as ‘broadly the same’:
[W]e do hold a stronger position, claiming that while psychological theory
and normative ethical theory are not reducible to each other, the two
enterprises are isomorphic or parallel. In other words, an adequate
psychological analysis of the structure of a moral judgment, and an

The initial impulse to write this paper came from a discussion in Cristina
Bicchieri’s fall 2012 class at the University of Pennsylvania on moral psychology.
Reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of the subject, the class drew students
from philosophy, psychology, economics, political science, and history. During a
week of studying Kohlberg and Gilligan’s work, there was a lively debate in class
on the continued relevance of reading Kohlberg, with (roughly) the nonphilosophers arguing that Kohlberg should be ignored since he got the facts wrong
and with the philosophers and historian responding that it is important to
understand where the discipline came from, that there is a complicated relation
between conceptual schemes and facts, and (in the case of one person) that there
are no facts per se. My response was that we should read Kohlberg because,
without being fully aware of it, we could inherit some of his conceptual baggage,
and we might not want some of that conceptual baggage. This paper extends that
point – what we as a discipline have inherited from Kohlberg is a rather odd idea
about the relation between descriptive psychology and normative theorizing,
that each is constrained by the other. And, I argue, we should not accept that.
17
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adequate normative analysis of the judgment will be made in similar
terms. In the context of our work, psychological description of moral
stages corresponds to the “deep structure” of systems of normative ethics.
The logical relations between stages represent indifferently the structure
of an adequate theory of moral judgment development, or the structure of
an adequate theory as to why one system of moral judgment is better than
another. Thus, we have argued for a parallelism between a theory of
psychological development and a formalistic moral theory on the ground
that the formal psychological developmental criteria of differentiation and
integration, of structural equilibrium, map into the formal moral criteria of
prescriptiveness and universality. (p. 224)
The particular details of Kohlberg’s account – related to differentiation,
integration, prescriptivity, and universality – need not concern us at the moment.
What is important to take from the passage is that, for Kohlberg, the logical
structure of the true descriptive account is isomorphic or parallel to the logical
structure of the right normative account, such that (i) each discourse contains
18

I apply “true” to the descriptive account and “right” to the normative account
in order to emphasize that Kohlberg still accepts some minimal conception of the
fact/value distinction, such that there are some instances of naturalistic fallacy
(of course, none from his own theory, according to Kohlberg). Kohlberg tries to
bridge the gap between the ‘true’ and the ‘right’ by means of a pragmatic
standard of ‘adequacy.’ But, “adequacy” itself is an evaluative notion and a
slippery one at that. “Adequate for what and to whom?” we should ask.
18
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the same or “similar” terms and that (ii) descriptions of types of moral judgment
19

directly map onto justifications of particular morality systems (and vice versa).

20

In this paper, I will argue that Kohlberg’s assumption is deeply wrong.
While I accept that findings in descriptive psychology should impact our
commitments to particular normative theories, I do not accept that our particular
normative theories should impact our commitment to accounts of descriptive
psychology, at least not in the strong way he demands.
We should not accept the latter because it is possible to develop an
account of moral psychology that is minimalist. By “minimalist,” I mean that it is
possible to theorize about descriptive moral psychology without importing
substantive and ultimately tendentious normative commitments. Since it is
possible to do that, we are not forced to accept Kohlberg’s assumption. We can

Kohlberg in the passage quoted above on this page talks about “similar” terms
but in other places (see the epigraph to this paper) talks about sameness. This
terminological fuzziness places pressure on his claim that there is an
“isomorphism” between psychological theory and normative ethical theory, for I
take it to be sound to say that if X is similar to Y, then X and Y are different in at
least one respect other than numerical identity (because if they were not different
in at least one respect other than numerical identity, then they would be the same
– speaking at the type rather than token level—and not similar). So, the similarity
relation is not “edge-preserving,” so to speak. Still, we need not get too hung up
on this point. For more, see (Goodman 1972).
“Morality system” is a philosophical term of art from Bernard Williams, first
developed in the late 1970s before fuller development in the 1980-90s. For our
purposes, allow “morality system” to pick out theories of morality as developed
by Western philosophers and theologians. Paradigmatic examples of the morality
system includes divine command theory, consequentialism (including
utilitarianism), deontology (including contractualism and contractarianism), and
(in its ambitious and universalistic forms) neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. To be
sure, these examples share common features that make them fall under the
concept ‘morality system,’ but those features are orthogonal to my argument
here. For more on Williams’s specific notion, see (1985).
19
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then choose between accepting the assumption on the basis of pragmatic or
meta-theoretical considerations. And there are two strong meta-theoretical
considerations that weight against the assumption: namely, the incoherence of
morality systems in general as a result of social and cultural evolutionary history
and the extraordinary “lightness” of metaethical philosophizing.
The structure of the paper will be as follows: first, I will further explicate
Kohlberg’s assumption – its motivations and its consequences – through a close
philosophical reading of “From Is to Ought.” Next, I will argue that we should
not accept the assumption, for reasons outlined above. Finally, I will conclude
with some considerations about the relation between realism and naturalism in
moral psychology, given a rejection of the assumption. A continued theme of this
paper is that we need a moral psychology, not a moralized psychology. By this I
mean to give slogan to the minimalist moral psychology partially described above.
But, if moral psychology is just to be the psychology of moralizing or certain
kinds of moralizing or the psychology of entertaining particular substantive
normative commitments, then perhaps we would be better off without moral
21

psychology as well.

22

2

The Assumption: Motivations

Such that “moral psychology” becomes a base kind of cognitive
phenomenology, or what-it’s-like to think that P (where P is some substantive
moral claim, like “justice is the supreme value” or “avoiding harm is the
trumping obligation” or “it’s wrong to torture cats for fun”).
I will not argue explicitly for this claim, but it will be implicit in much of the
discussion to follow.
21
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It is important to note at the outset that Kohlberg’s assumption is, in fact,
an assumption. There are two ways this is so: he does not provide an argument for
the claim, and there are reasons the claim must be an assumption – there is no
framework from which we can say, ex ante to the deliverances of his moral
psychology, that descriptive psychology and normative theory go hand-in-hand.
Because of his pragmatist orientation, Kohlberg must be committed to a view
where his claim can be vindicated by means of the results of the theory. To put the
point metaphorically, if the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the claim “the
pudding is delicious” can only be vindicated after tasting it (and in virtue of how
it tastes), never demonstrated or compelled by considerations prior to the
eating.

23

But, given that the assumption is an assumption, why would anyone
assume that? I propose that there are two reasons Kohlberg made the
assumption. The first is a reason related to history of the practice of psychology,
the second related to Kohlberg’s substantive normative commitments.
Kohlberg saw the evolution of developmental psychology in the 20

th

century as moving away from behaviorist models to cognitivist models.
Behaviorist models, focused on stimulus and response, provide an explanation
where it is assumed that
the process of learning truths is the same as the processes of learning lies
or illusions. It explains the learning of logical operations or “truths” in
On Kohlberg’s acceptance of his claim as an assumption and his acceptance of
pragmatic vindication, see p. 225.
23
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terms of the same processes as those involved in learning a social dance
step (which is cognitively neutral), or those involved in “learning” a
psychosis or a pattern of maze errors (which are cognitively erroneous).
(1971, p. 152)
The scare quotes are illustrative. First, learning a dance is not a matter of truth at
all, according to Kohlberg. Presumably, he has a conception of truth where truth
is a property of propositions, specifically of propositions of the form “S knows
that P.” A dance is not a proposition – learning the pattern of bodily movements
24

that are constitutive of the dance such that you can perform the dance does not
represent the world as being such-and-such way. To be sure, there is a pattern, and
one can learn – in a straightforward sense of “learn” – the pattern. But, to learn
the dance would be an instance of knowledge-how, not knowledge-that. Presumably,
then, only the contents of ‘knowledge-that’ count as truths. Second, things that
are “cognitively erroneous,” like lies or illusions or ways through a maze that do
not get you out of the maze, are not things that can be properly “learned.” This
suggests that we can only “learn” that which is, in fact, true.
By hypothesis, then, we can come to believe that, say, the present king of
France is bald, but, if in point of fact there is no king of France presently, then we
did not learn what we believe. Putting these two points together, we can say that,

Strictly speaking, the proposition would be “that P,” to which the propositional
attitude “knowing” attaches. I will treat the entire expression as a proposition
since I am not particular interested in nor is it relevant to my argument to discuss
the metaphysics of proposition-hood.
24
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for Kohlberg, we can only learn what is true and that the only things that can be
true are propositions.

25

But, behaviorism was unable to distinguish between the three cases,
between the “cognitively true,” the “cognitively erroneous,” and the “cognitively
neutral.” Specifically, behaviorism could not pick out the “cognitive” as a distinct
psychological process. But the pioneering work of Piaget on the childhood
development of concepts like space, time, and causality demonstrates that
explaining the behavior of children requires philosophical, epistemic notions
(again, like space, time and causality). (Kohlberg 1971, p. 152). So, a psychology
rested on behaviorist epistemology was insufficiently explanatory: it did not
explain the types of things that we know to exist. We know that children have
certain ways of getting around the world that are more successful than others.
How do we explain that? –By invoking a cognitive-psychological mechanism
that makes possible such developments.
Kohlberg think that since such an explanation was in the offing in one
area of developmental psychology, it should be in the offing in all areas of
developmental psychology. This assumption provides one basis for the
assumption, the assumption at issue in this paper about the relation of descriptive
psychology and normative theorizing.

We can of course relax the standard to include belief-states that do not have
fully explicit propositional form. We could have inchoate beliefs, and those could
still be true, for they are truth-apt (by the hypothesis that for a mental state to be
a belief state is for it to be truth-apt).
25
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Of course, all this groundwork is to a point already assumed in the
discipline: if there is development, then the development develops toward
something or other. But this high level of generalization is insufficient for
26

Kohlberg. It cannot be the case that our moral cognition – or even cognition more
generally – develops toward something or other. It has to develop toward some
thing. That particular thing is going to be the ideal. At the highest level of
generality, the ideal is the example par excellence of whatever thing is under
consideration – it is that thing that best exemplifies what makes a thing of that
type a thing of that type.

27

In the realm of moral cognition, this means that there must be an ideal
form of moral thinking. That is, there is a form of moral thinking that best
exemplifies what makes moral thinking moral thinking. That “best
exemplification” or ideal specifies (a) what moral cognition develops toward by
(b) giving a standard against which to measure (c) either alignment with or
deviation from the standard. At any point along the development trajectory, the
next level of development contains the previous level and adds something
distinct. There is need of a next level if, at a level, that level that the development
is at is unable to solve for problems that the level identifies as problems. The
development trajectory halts just in case there is a level of development that

A tautology, to be sure, but a useful one. It provides prima facie evidence that
further refinements move away from tautology toward the substantive. The
substantive can always be denied on the grounds of empirical falsity or
conceptual incoherence.
This is truly at the highest level of intelligible generality. “Thing” here could
pick out objects of different kinds – physical and intentional – as well as events,
sequences, orders and the like. My use is catholic and ecumenical.
26
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solves all problems of previous levels while not encountering any problems that
are recognized as problems from that level.
But, how do we find out which form of moral thinking provides that sort
of “best exemplification?” One way – a pragmatist way, Kohlberg’s way – is to
ask, “What is moral thinking for?” We try to figure out what role or function
morality performs for those who have morality. Given that only humans have
morality, we try to figure out what problems does morality allow humans to
solve. Kohlberg (1971) has an answer: the function of moral cognition is to
resolve moral conflicts with others, to give guidance in how we should act in
different environments, to eliminate moral dilemmas, and to do these things in a
stable and consistent way (p. 185). The requirements of stability and consistency in
resolving moral conflicts give rise to demands for a formalistic metaethic with
certain substantive content claims. The substantive content claims relate to the
value of persons and to the supreme overriding value of justice. The particular
details need not bother us here.
To summarize, there were two reasons Kohlberg makes the assumption,
one related to developmental psychology as a discipline and one related to the
substantive normative commitment he held. The second reason is intimately tied
to the consequences of the assumption, so although I have broached the topic in
this section, my extended discussion takes place in the next.
3

The Assumption: Its Consequences
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It just so happens that Kohlberg’s identified function has the salubrious
effect that it vanquishes a range of views that Kohlberg (1971) does not accept:
descriptive relativism (p. 176), normative relativism (p. 180), emotivism (p.
28

29

184), epistemological intuitionism (p. 184), motivational internalism (pp. 21730

31

218), and critical / analytic metaethics (pp. 224-225). Also vanquished is the
32
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normative theory that corresponds to each level of moral thinking that is lower
than Stage 6 theory (1971, p. 216): Stage 1’s rule-and-authority obeying morality,
Stage 2’s rational egoism, Stage 3’s commonsense morality, sentimentalism and
virtue ethics, Stage 4’s conventional morality and rule-and-authority maintaining
morality, and Stage 5’s rule-utilitarianism, social contract theories, and
34

Descriptive relativism is a moral metaphysic that says that morality differs from
culture to culture.
Normative relativism is a normative doctrine that says that we should not judge
people from cultures that have different standards than our own.
Emotivism is a semantic theory that says that the meaning of moral terms is
captured completely by their emotive content. More specifically, emotivism
holds that moral language expresses or evinces speaker attitudes, where the
attitudes are taken as non-cognitive. For the classical position, see (Ayer 1952).
The term “epistemological intuitionism” comes from Williams and is meant to
contrast with “methodological intuitionism.” Epistemological intuitionism posits
that we intuit or directly apprehend moral facts by means of a special epistemic
faculty. G. E. Moore’s metaethic is a classic example. See (Williams 1998b) and
(Moore 1996).
Motivational internalism is a moral metaphysic that says that morality is, in
some way to be specified, inherently motivating. In stronger forms, it denies the
possibility of the amoralist – someone who says, “I understand X is right, but
why should I care?” Kohlberg’s theory is externalist, in this sense.
Critical/analytic metaethics is a semantic and epistemological theory that says
that the task of moral philosophy is to clarify the principles that are already
implicit in “ordinary” moral language.
Some people take Kohlberg to be developing a theory of moral cognition that is
roughly contractarian. This is a mistake. He writes,
At stage 5, the core of justice was (a) liberty or civil rights, (b) equality of
opportunity, and (c) contract. These three ideas were united by respect for
the freedom of others, as this freedom is embodied in civil law and civil
28
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methodological non-relativism. The last theory standing is the morality of Stage
6 morality: deontological, or principled, intuitionism (1971, p. 212, p. 219). What
35

is remarkable is the range of types of views that Kohlberg’s assumption plus
theory licenses him to strike: moral-semantic theories, moral-epistemological
theories, moral-metaphysical theories, moral-motivational theories, descriptive
psychological theories, and substantive normative theories.
But what is philosophically interesting is that Kohlberg’s moves to strike
rival theories only work in the context of identifying standards of metaethical
correctness, and the only way to identify standards of metaethical correctness is
by appeal to substantive normative theory.

rights. At stage 6, the sense of justice becomes clearly focused on the rights
of humanity independent of civil society. (p. 212)
Or consider this quote: “We have been arguing that, both by stage 6 normative
ethical standards and by formalist metaethical criteria, stage 6 is a more moral
mode of judgment than stages 5 or 4” (p. 217). He does allow that Rawls derives
Stage 6 morality from Stage 5 morality, but only insofar as the morality pertains
to social-political choices (which does not exhaust the content of Stage 6
morality) (p. 226).
Kohlberg invokes as representative of Stage 6 morality the kind of morality
endorsed by Ross and Sidgwick. His claims about motivational externalism and
the impossibility of answering the amoralist in non-moral terms call to mind
another deontological intuitionist – namely, Prichard. See (Ross 2002), (Sidgwick
1981), and Prichard (1912). All in all, Kohlberg’s theory amounts to a rather
boilerplate recapitulation of the type of deontological moral theorizing prevalent
in the early 20 century between the publication of Moore’s Principia in 1903 and
Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic in 1936. Of course, Sidgwick came before this
period and tried to defend consequentialism. But, he accepted a kind of
principled intuitionism, which Kohlberg notes even if some contemporary moral
psychologists – less philosophically able than Kohlberg – deny that Sidgwick
used intuitions at all (p. 219). Kohlberg’s philosophical mistake is to identify any
reliance on principles and formalism as underlying a deontological position.
Deontology just is the normative theory that says that an act is right iff it accords
with the right moral rule. Sidgwick never accepted that.
35
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Substantive normative morality is the “thick” stuff of the moral life: the
particular and substantive commitments that we have as moral agents
embodying a particular moral worldview. For example, a hedonistic maximizing
utilitarian might have the particular and substantive commitment to eradicate
factory farming, where the content of her normative reason consists of the idea
that eliminating factory farming will move the world from one state of affairs to
another and that the latter state of affairs contains more overall utility as
measured by pleasure/pain indices. This utilitarian may have a realist metaethic,
such that she considers her normative reason formally as a mind-independent fact
and as on a par with the other sorts of facts given realistic interpretations in, say,
the natural sciences. Her explanation of why her normative reason is normative is
that it is true that factory farming is wrong.
Kohlberg’s theory is like that, not in the sense that his is realist
utilitarianism but in the sense that substantive morality and metaethical
theorizing go hand-in-hand. He claims that morality is sui generis and formally
autonomous – that is, morality is not a subset of any other domain. Because of
this metaethical “fact,” Kohlberg (1971) can say things like,
The general criterion we have used in saying that a higher stage’s mode of
judgment is more adequate than a lower stage is that of morality itself, not
of conceptions of rationality or sophistication imported from other
domains. (p. 215)

45

or like, “We have been arguing that, both by stage 6 normative ethical standards
and by formalist metaethical criteria, stage 6 is a more moral mode of judgment
than stages 5 or 4” (p. 217, emphasis mine). And what of this criterion of
“morality itself?” We get to it by means of the formal metaethical
characterization of the features of moral thought. The features that we build into
the formal characterization constrain the choices at the normative level. For
Kohlberg (1971), the metaethic uniquely determines at least some of the
substantive normative content to which our moral theory is committed:
If our formal characterization of the functioning of mature principles is
correct, it is clear that only principles of justice have an ultimate claim to
being adequate universal, prescriptive principles. By definition, principles
of justice are principles for deciding competing claims of individuals, for
“giving each man his due.” When principles, including considerations of
human welfare, are reduced to guides for considering such claims, they
become expressions of the single principle of justice. (pp. 219-220)
Kohlberg then goes on to discuss taking considerations of human welfare as an
alternate content claim before rejecting the position for failing to satisfy the
metaethical constraints of prescriptivity and universality.
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But, assume that Kohlberg is right that the metaethical constraints
uniquely yield the principles of justice as the correct normative principles. And
In essence, arguing in the opposite direction – against utilitarianism – from
universality and prescriptivity than the philosopher most wellknown for
introducing universal prescriptivism as a metaethical theory. For that other view,
see (Hare 1981).
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assume that the metaethical constraints uniquely pick out his descriptive
psychology. What we have, if Kohlberg is to be believed, is a case of a very
powerful explanation: moral psychology interlocks with moral epistemology,
moral metaphysics and moral semantics, which in turn interlocks with first-order
normative commitments to a contentful principle of justice. In the end of
explanation, then, moral psychology is linked to substantive normative morality,
via logical connection.
4

The Assumption: Its Problems
Say that you have a particular first-order normative commitment to

the principles of justice as understood at the Stage 6 level of Kohlberg’s theory. In
fact, say that you are deeply committed to the principles. Given that you have
such a commitment, it would be convenient if there were a metaethic that
uniquely picked out your commitment. Even better, what if that metaethic
validated one account of moral cognition over all others? Then, in virtue of
establishing the metaethic by means of laying out the descriptive psychological
evidence in support of that ethic, you have laid out support for your normative
commitment. You get the normative commitment for free by means of “logical
necessity.”
But, of course, you get the normative commitment for free only in virtue
of making the metaethic and the psychology out of the materials of the
normative commitment at hand. You start with the normative commitment, you
reverse engineer a metaethic that uniquely selects your normative commitment,
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and you propose a psychological mechanism that is “isomorphic” or “parallel” to
your metaethic. If there really is an isomorphism, then the psychological
mechanism must also uniquely select your normative commitment. One way to
look at the resulting omni-theory is to see it as having great explanatory breadth
and depth. Another is to see it as an instance of circular reasoning: your
normative commitment allows you to rule out certain metaethics, which allows
you to rule out certain psychological mechanisms, which allows you to rule out
certain metaethics, which allows you to rule out certain other proposed
normative commitments. But, at no point in the “explanation” have you
provided anything like a reason to accept the omni-theory for someone not
already in the grip of the normative commitment.
One consequence from the assumption is that it allows the theorist to
strike all sorts of rival theories, theories in the psychological, metaethical and
first-order normative domains. A second consequence is that it allows for the
possibility of the theorist reverse engineering an explanatory and justificatory
framework for the particular normative commitments she happens to hold. A
third consequence is that the assumption promotes a circular theory, although
whether you find the theory virtuously or viciously so will depend on whether
you accept the point of entry.
I do not mean the preceding paragraphs as an opening salvo in yet
another round of the most boring topic in all of moral philosophy: who has the
right definition of morality? That topic – definitions of morality and their
taxonomies – is of vanishingly small importance, for people go on in the absence
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of such definitions. Rather, I suggest that something like the paragraph above
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offers partial explanation for Kohlberg making the assumption at issue for this
paper. Of course, this is speculative psychology, and there can be no apodictic
philosophical demonstration of such speculation. But, and this is the upshot, it is
explanatory of why someone would make Kohlberg’s assumption. As Williams
gestures at in the epigraph to this paper, when a psychological mechanism that
has a unique fit with a moral conception is proposed, we do well to wonder if the
mechanism itself is part of the moral conception. If it is part of the moral
conception, then why should we accept it as a matter of psychology? To jabber on
about the sui generis and autonomous nature of morality is, at that point, to
severely miss the point. So too would giving an architectonic of the thirteen or
thirty definitions of morality from the history of moral philosophy.
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Skepticism about psychological mechanisms that have unique fits with
moral conceptions rest upon skepticism about the moral conceptions. Another
way to put the point is to say that if the mechanism implies the conception, then
attacks on the conception imply attacks on the mechanism. If commitment to the
39

moral conception is not compulsory – not obviously right – there is a lurking
problem for the descriptive theory.
5

The Minimalist Alternative

Although it is interesting to observe that some of those most heavily invested in
preserving the practical status of morality are so concerned with making sure that
everyone have the right definition in mind. Often, arguments of this sort are
unclear about the form/content and theory/practice relations.
Or however many artificially selected . . .
An application of modus tollens.
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This is not to say that there is a theoretically neutral way to characterize
the psychology of moral cognition. Nor is it to say that we can excise all of our
normative commitments in developing our descriptive theories. My call is not a
call for vulgar positivism or dogmatic intuitionism. Rather, I suggest instead a
minimalist moral psychology.
Borrowing from Williams, we can say that a moral psychology is
40

minimalist iff it satisfies two conditions. The two conditions go together, but I will
discuss them in turn.
The first condition relates to how much moral content we should place
into our account of the psychology of human beings. Williams (1998b) writes:
First, to the question ‘how much should our accounts of distinctively
moral activity add to our accounts of other human activity?’ it replies ‘as
little as possible’, and the more that some moral understanding of human
beings seems to call on materials that specially serve the purposes of
morality – certain conceptions of the will, for instance – the more reason
we have to ask whether they may not be a more illuminating account that
rests only on conceptions that we use anyway elsewhere. (p. 68)
Williams in this passage is talking about conceptions of the will like Kant’s,
conceptions where there is always a double-action. But, the particular details
41

Who in turn borrowed from Nietzsche.
The point: for each action, that account of willing adds another – namely, the
action of willing! The action of willing is marshaled as an explanation of action,
but it cannot really serve as an explanation of action (any more than Unmoved
Mover arguments “explain” the sequence of events in the natural order). The
40
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need not concern us. What is relevant is that we have an account of human
cognition. Of this account of cognition, we should import as little specifically
moral material as possible in constructing it. This, too, should hold for our
accounts of moral cognition. We try to provide accounts of moral cognition: how
much should our descriptive account of moral cognition import from our normative
commitments as agents involved in interacting with others as moral agents?
Kohlberg’s answer: “Quite a bit.” We import a conception of justice linked
closely to a very special notion of human beings as free and equal moral persons
with inviolable dignity. We import a conception of moral judgment with strong
demands related to universalizability, prescriptivity, and so on. We import a
conception of the relation of the two where the formal features of moral
judgment uniquely yield the substantive content that is the first-order
commitment to justice.
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Of course, Kohlberg (1971) claims that his metaethical conception of the
later stages as more moral than the earlier stages does not amount to a normative
ethical principle (p. 217). And he claims that his Stage 6 principles do not directly
require any rule of action or theory of the good (p. 217). But each claim is simply
not true and simply not true on his own account. The metaethical conception
does amount to a normative ethical principle: since anyone at a stage can
understand the reasoning of any stage lower and since occupying a stage does
question arises, “What explains the willing?” and there is no good answer for
that in the offing. Hence, Kant invokes transcendental psychology and noumenal
purposes, explaining the difficult by means of the baffling. See (Kant 1998),
especially the third section.
As understood in its Stage 6 interpretation.
42
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not directly determine that you will think only in terms of that stage, it is
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possible, at any stage above the first, for you to choose your approach the
structure with which you are trying to achieve equilibrium. Say I am at Stage 3. I
can choose between deciding to do something on the basis of virtue ethical
considerations or deciding to do something on the basis of rational egoistic
considerations (i.e., Stage 2). Kohlberg’s theory says that I should deliberate from
Stage 3. It is normative: it “authoritatively” tell me which path to pick among
options and “resolves” the “moral conflict” of choosing between deliberative
stages.
Consider now the Stage 6 principles of justice: they say that it is best to
regard people as free and equal moral persons with inviolable dignity. It defies
my comprehension that this does not amount to a rule of action. If I can choose
between an action in accordance with the principle and one not, I should always
chooses to act in accordance with the principle, according to the principle. If there is
a preponderance of principles, I should choose the action that satisfies more of
the principles than any other available course of action. I see no other way to
read the claim.
This last paragraphs shows how much the assumption assumes. It
assumes quite a bit of distinctively moral content – about the nature of
obligations, about the moral nature of human beings, and about permissible
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That is, with causal necessity.
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action. This is to say that contrary to Kohlberg’s claims, his theory does have
something to say about the nature of the good and the nature of approbation.
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I will give a first approximation as to what counts as importing as little
distinctively moral content in a bit. But, before I do, I must lay out the second
aspect of the minimalist position, for the second aspect goes some way toward
that first approximation. Williams (1998a) continues:
This demand for moral psychological minimalism is not, however, just an
application of an Occamist desire for economy, and this is the second
aspect of the Nietzschean general attitude. Without some guiding sense of
what materials we should use in giving our economical explanations, such
an attitude will simply fall back into the difficulties we have already met.
Nietzsche’s approach is to identify an excess of moral content in
psychology by appealing first to what an experienced, honest, subtle, and
unoptimistic interpreter might make of human behavior elsewhere. (p. 68)

Namely, that it is good to do the right thing by treating other humans as free and
equal moral persons and that punishment may be required, as a matter of fact
given a limited set of available actions, for distinctively moral reasons not related
to concerns of social utility (where social utility is read in a consequentialist,
read: non-principled, way). That a deontological theory of the right has plenty to
say about the good did not strike other early 20 century deontological or
principled intuitionists as wrong. See (Ross 2002). The whole point of Ross’s
theory was to invert Moore’s analysis. (Moore 1996) says that ‘good’ is a sui
generis concept but that ‘right’ is analyzable in terms of being productive of the
good. For Ross, ‘right’ is the sui generis concept, and ‘good’ is analyzable in terms
of being productive of the right. This rather obvious fact is still accepted as rather
obvious in the way that we introduce undergraduates to consequentialism and
deontology: a common gloss is that consequentialism defines the right through
the good and that deontology defines the good through the right.
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The kind of “economical explanations” at issue here are explanations of the
naturalized sort. Here I endorse Brian Leiter’s (2002) reading of Nietzsche as
primarily a soft methodological naturalist. Soft methodological naturalism holds
45

that philosophical enquiries should be continuous with the methods of successful
natural and social sciences, including “styles of explanation and understanding
employed in the sciences” (Leiter 2002, p. 4). Nietzsche is a substantive naturalist
with respect to ruling out all forms of supernaturalistic – theistic or deistic –
explanation. I take Williams’s position to be the same, and I too subscribe to soft
methodological naturalism combined with substantive naturalism about
theological talk.
The “difficulties we have already met” refers to the difficulties in general
with provided a naturalized moral psychology. These are the particular difficulties
that I have been claiming beset Kohlberg’s theory. Williams (1998a) again:
If a ‘naturalistic’ moral psychology has to characterize moral activity in a
vocabulary that can be equally applied to every other part of nature, then
it is committed to a physicalistic reduction that is clearly hopeless. If it is
to describe moral activity in terms that can be applied to something else,
but not everything else, we have not much idea what those terms may be,
or how ‘special’ moral activity is allowed to be, consonantly with
naturalism. If we are allowed to describe moral activity in whatever terms

See especially chapter 1, “Introduction: Nietzsche, naturalist or postmodernist,”
pp. 1-30.
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moral activity may seem to invite, naturalism excludes nothing, and we
are back at the beginning. (p. 67)
We have three options for naturalizing moral cognition: in terms of a general
purpose discourse that applies to every other part of nature, in terms of whatever
discourse moral cognition seems to invite, or in terms of some in-between
discourse – a discourse where some things apply but not all. I agree with
Williams that the first option is hopeless: the only candidate option is theoretical
physics, and it would both be a fool’s errand and a serious misunderstanding of
moral thought to try to characterize it in terms of fundamental particles (or their
fields) worked upon by forces understood as laws of nature. It is the wrong level
of explanation altogether. So, that only leaves two options: allow in whatever
discourse morality requires or seems to require, or describe morality in a
discourse that is outside of morality yet the universe of which is “suitably
restricted.”
Kohlberg opts for the first of the remaining two options: in order to
explain moral cognition, he will invoke whatever terms moral cognition seem to
him to invite. This includes the terms in his formalistic metaethics and the
determinate and substantive content of Stage 6 morality. It also includes the
determinate and substantive content of each stage prior to Stage 6. That is to say,
in explaining what makes the lower stages stages, given the assumption,
Kohlberg calls on the determinate and substantive content of all possible
morality systems and folk moral worldviews. Strictly speaking, rational egoism,
virtue ethics, conventionalism, legalism, social contract theories, and
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utilitarianism are all present in the theory, if only to be subordinated under the
master notions of justice and deontological intuitionism. He excludes nothing:
protests that pre-conventional moralities (Stages 1 and 2) are not proper
moralities (because not properly principled) are themselves unprincipled, given
that each higher stage must recognize the previous stage as something from which
it sprang.
The last remaining option is the only real option for naturalistic moral
psychology, hence for moral psychology. But, the last option directly cuts against
the assumption. If we do not know how the restrict our universe of discourse,
then how can we know, either in advance or as a result of “investigation,” which
terms are the genuinely referring terms that carry sense? Does moral cognition
have to be universal and prescriptive? If so, is there a basis for that besides
antipathy for relativism?
I should quickly note that Kohlberg’s strategy with regard to relativism is
to show that all versions rest on different “logical fallacies.” That is an
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insufficient strategy. Relativism may well rest on a mistake and be conceptually

Another unfortunate habit that Kohlberg picked up from early 20 century
metaethicists is the habit of labeling all opponent views as resting on a fallacy or
a mistake. Besides expressing a generally negative outlook about the cognitive
abilities of the interlocutor, such moves also involve some narcissistic preening.
See the end of (Kohlber 1971) where he is discussing truths passed down from
Socrates, truths that psychologists have not accepted. Kohlberg’s explanation: “Is
it so surprising that psychologists have never understood Socrates? It is hard to
understand if you are not stage 6” (p. 232). That statement has pretty sour
implicature: either Kohlberg is not stage 6 but is smart enough to overcome the
deficiency (unlike all his opponents), and he is stage 6 and so is both smarter and
better than his opponents.
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incoherent. That does not show that universalism is conceptually coherent. You
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need additional premises: relativism and universalism are the only options, they
are mutually exclusive, they are opposite such that the falsity of one implies the
truth of the other, and so on. And you need to exhaust all possible logical types
of relativism and universalism. Needless to say, Kohlberg did not accomplish
that daunting task. And, there may be in principle reasons why he could not.
After all, if, as Kohlberg claims, moralities are constructions putting responses in
equilibrium with structures, then, as environments and material conditions
continue to change, what counts as “equilibrium” is also subject to that change.
This is another way of saying that Kohlberg’s identification of the function of
morality is merely a reflection of his own personal predilection.
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The important point is that we are not compelled to accept Kohlberg’s
analysis. There is a minimalist option of the table. The minimalist option need
not necessarily be relativist: it is possible to develop a universalist minimalism.
What I call “vulgar relativism” is surely incoherent: P1. Morality varies across
cultures. P2. There is no overarching standard by which to judge among other
cultures. So, C., Don’t judge and be tolerant!
This is yet another reason to avoid the most boring question in moral
philosophy. We can allow that “morality” means this or that or the other while
still saying that the function of morality is such-and-such. To bring in an
illustration from perception, we can say that “X looks red” means “X has the
micro-physical structure corresponding to red” or “X seems red to person P in
circumstance C” or “Red is the quality of my sense-datum in relation to
perceiving thing X.” Regardless, we could still identify the function of X looking
red by means of the causal role looking red plays in behavior (say, in identifying
pomegranates). But, where there are multiple possible functions in play and
where the function is given a self-referential role, then assigning non-reductive
content to the function becomes problematic. Example: the function of morality
could be to allow the weak to keep the strong in check, or the function of
morality could be to allow us to solve moral conflicts. On the basis of what do we
identify the function? On the basis of what do we say that there is a “the
function?”
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The universalist minimalism imports very little into the psychology: it would not
import, for example, universal prescriptivism or full role reversal. It would
explain particular moral judgments by means of other ready-to-hand tools that do
not have distinctive moral content: here I am thinking of theories of social norms,
decision theory, theories of rationality, theories of politics and so on.
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6

Meta-Theoretical Considerations in Favor of Minimalism
So, we have to choose between the Kohlbergian assumption and the

minimalist paradigm. I argue that there are two meta-theoretical considerations
that should have some weight in pushing us toward minimalism: first, morality
systems in general are incoherent, and second, metaethical theorizing, once
already in the naturalistic purview, is unlikely to have any effect on first-order
cognition.
First, morality systems in general are incoherent. From a naturalistic
perspective, this is unsurprising. If morality systems are the products of
biological and cultural evolution, reflecting a line of constant adjustments from
different pressures, then we ought to expect that morality cannot be reflectively
coherent. Outside of the morality systems themselves, the stuff of ethical life –
our thoughts and practices related to getting along with along humans with
killing them – is itself not the kind of thing that can hang neatly together. If we
assume, as seems entirely reasonable, that there are ineliminable moral
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dilemmas in the actual world and if we combine that assumption with the
49
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On social norms, see (Bicchieri 2005).
See (Marcus 1980).
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conception of morality as dilemma-solver in the actual world, then morality is
51

more likely than not incoherent. It probably cannot perform what it claims is its
function to perform. We eliminate the incoherence by abandoning one of the
claims, and that move will reflect antecedent normative commitments that we
have about the nature of obligation as such.
Besides coherence, there remains the fact that metaethical theorizing, like
many kinds of philosophical theorizing, is extremely “light.” What I mean by this
is that these second-order theorizings rarely have first-order effects. Think of
Hume and his account of causality. Hume’s second-order skepticism did not
prevent him from judging accurately the trajectory of billiard balls at the bar.
Would second-order optimism have made much of a difference? Likewise,
Kohlberg himself argues that, even though there is a difference between different
philosophical conceptions of ‘morality,’ there are no fundamental differences
between those philosophical conceptions when those conceptions are measured
as against psychological conceptions. Now, I find this implausible, for a
naturalized position would be a philosophical conception but would look an
awful lot like a psychological conception. Still, given what we know about the
relations in general between first and second-order theories, we should be highly
skeptical of any claim giving priority to a second-order theory to uniquely
determine first-order content about which the second-order theory theorizes.
Humean skepticism with regard to causality does not issue in first-order
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One of Kohlberg’s assumptions.
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skepticism that if I drop this cup, it will fall to the ground. What special reason is
there for assuming the moral case is different than that?
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I conclude that there has not been good reason to accept the assumption.
There is an alternative on the table – minimalism. Meta-theoretical considerations
favor minimalism over the assumption. This considers are not positivist
applications of a principle of parsimony; rather, they emerge from a meditation
on the substance of the moral life as lived. Theory cannot assume away the
world. Nor can it make unintelligible practice.
7

Conclusion: Realism and Naturalism in Moral Psychology
In my paper, I showed that Kohlberg had a strong assumption about an

isomorphism or parallelism between descriptive accounts of the development of
moral cognition and normative accounts of (a) the right formalist metaethic
combined with (b) certain substantive normative claims about the nature of
justice and persons. And I argued against it on the basis of an existing alternative
and metatheoretical considerations. But, moral psychology as a field has moved
far past Kohlberg, and today the field is one generating great enthusiasm and
interests across academic disciplines.

Again, this is with the caveat that we are already working within a paradigm of
naturalistic moral psychology. If you have subscribe to a supernaturalistic
metaethic, I am more than willing to admit that giving up that metaethic would
have profound and pervasive effects on the contents of your first-order beliefs.
But I believe that only on the basis of lots of empirical evidence – social-scientific,
personal-anecdotal, and cultural-historical. But a lot of the case from certain
kinds of constructivists and expressivists on this matter about how metaethical
positions are kinds of normative positions just emphasizes the fact of the
normative horse pushing all the carts.
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There are at least two kinds of moral psychology: first, a psychology that
takes as its subject matter those behaviors identified as “moral,” and, second, a
philosophy that takes as its subject matter those theories identified as “moral.” In
each kind of moral psychology, then, a practitioner must have some antecedent
conception of “moral” that she brings to bear on her subject matter.
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However, when philosophers talk about ‘moral psychology,’ they mean to
restrict discussion to something rather particular. They often mean to talk about
moral psychology as a way of ruling out certain normative ethical theories. The
argument frequently goes like this: normative ethical theories presuppose a
picture of human nature, and if particular picture of human nature presupposed
by a particular normative ethical theory is false, that gives us reason to reject the
normative ethical theory.
This is fine, as far as it goes. But, it does not go very far. This is related to a
point that I tried to make at the end of the paper: we do not know how much to
include into our universe of moral discourse. And, naturalism, per se, seems to be
of no help in helping us get closer to an answer.
This does mean that we must make a value judgment with respect how
we plan on partitioning the world. And it is here that I reassert the value of
realism over naturalism. “Realism” here is not about a doctrine of mindSome philosophers – namely Kant but also his followers, direct or indirect –
took this rather plain fact as a great triumph, an indication of the autonomy of
normative ethical theory from the messy realities of what used to be called
“philosophical anthropology.” I never understood how that inference was
supposed to work, especially given Kant’s embrace of “ought implies can.” See
(Kant 1998).
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independence. Recall this quote from Williams (1998a): “Nietzsche’s approach is
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to identify an excess of moral content in psychology by appealing first to what an
experienced, honest, subtle, and unoptimistic interpreter might make of human
behavior elsewhere” (p. 67). The “realism” under discussion refers to the type of
attitude we take our interpreter to have. She is “realistic” with respect to the true
sources of human behavior, but that does not mean that she accepts nihilism or
amoralism or whatever other bogeyman dreamt up by the moral philosopher. A
way of being realistic is by adopting a hermeneutics of suspicion. In was by
adopting this realistic method that I was able to make the conjecture that at least
part of what motivated Kohlberg to accept the assumption was a particular
commitment to a particular form of morality with particular content claims,
related to justice and persons.
But, as Williams (1998a) is right to point out, the method works only if
you are not suspicious of everything (pp. 68-69). In a way, it is like skepticism or
projectivism. Skepticism only works if there is at least one thing you are not
skeptical about, from which you can launch your skeptical doubts, projectivism
only work if there is some thing upon which the projection projects. These points
55

indicate a problem with taking skepticism or expressivism as global attitudes,
commitments, or methods. Likewise for suspicion.
Does this mean, then, that there must be at least one substantively
normative commitment that we must make if we are to theorize about moral
However finessed.
For local moral expressivists, the “natural world” is that which is projected
upon. See (Blackburn 1993).
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cognition at all? I do not think this follows. If we read “substantively normative”
as indicating the type of commitment that Kohlberg had to his principles of
justice, we need not be committed to any such thing. His commitment was not
defeasible, for him, as it must be for the realist.
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I thank Cristina Bicchieri, Molly Sinderbrand, Kyle Adams for discussions
related to earlier forms of this paper. All faults remain my own.
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LOCATING THE NORMATIVE INSIGNIFICANCE OF NEUROSCIENCE
1

Introduction
In this paper, my broad aim is to identify some problems with the moral

psychology by focusing in particular on the debate between Selim Berker and
Joshua Greene. Greene has steadily produced work that draws upon the
resources of both neuroscience and social psychology to give an explanation of
moral psychology – and, according to him, an explanation of moral philosophy
57

itself. Berker, on the other hand, is a humanist critic of Greene’s approach (and,
58

in the end, of any approach that attempts to draw upon empirical facts to reveal
normative truths, insights, or predictions).
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The plan for the paper is as follows: first, I will present Berker’s Dilemma
for any account that attempts to use neuroscience (and neuroscientific evidence)
to draw normative conclusions. I argue that Berker mischaracterizes Greene’s
position or assumes fairly strong normative commitments disallowed by the

See (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen 2001), (Greene 2003),
(Greene & Haidt 2002), and (Greene 2007).
Consider this passage (that many humanists find deeply confused) from
(Greene 2013):
At some point, it dawns on you: Morality is not what generations of
philosophers and theologians have thought it to be. Morality is not a set of
freestanding abstract truths that we can somehow access with our limited
human minds. Moral psychology is not something that occasionally
intrudes into the abstract realm of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is
a manifestation of moral psychology. Moral philosophies are, once again,
just the intellectual tips of much bigger and deeper psychological and
biological icebergs. Once you’ve understood this, your whole view of
morality changes. Figure and ground reverse, and you see competing
moral philosophies not just as points in an abstract philosophical space
but as the predictable products of our dual-process brains. (p. 329)
See (Berker 2009) and (Berker 2014).
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principles of Minimal Moral Psychology. In particular, Greene is not committed
to many of the invalid inferences that Berker addresses, and Greene is not trying
to draw normative conclusions merely from descriptive neuroscientific premises.
However, I think that Berker’s Dilemma does stick to Greene inasmuch as he
attempts to use neuroscientific evidence to support psychological theory that in
turn is meant to support classical utilitarianism as the correct decision procedure
for resolving intrapersonal and interpersonal normative disagreement. When
60

we examine Greene’s arguments, we see that it is in the move to support a grand
metamorality that Greene falls prey to Berker’s Dilemma. I conclude by reflecting
on how my diagnosis of the problems with both Berker and Greene should be, in
principle, acceptable to each.
2

Summary of Greene’s Original Work
A large part of Greene’s earlier research, starting in 2001, attempts to bring

neuroscientific evidence to bear on the Trolley Problem. For the sake of
simplicity, let us say that the “Trolley Problem” is the problem of resolving the
apparent conflict between judgments concerning the “Switch” and “Footbridge”
thought experiments:
SWITCH: “You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching
a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five
railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway
workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing
the deaths of the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these
workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to
proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. Is it
That is, Berker’s Dilemma sticks to the main argument of (Greene 2013) but not
to earlier arguments about the harm domain.
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appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the
five workmen?”

FOOTBRIDGE: “A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward
five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present
course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the
approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save
the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and
onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The
stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. Is it
appropriate for you to push the stranger onto the tracks in order to save
the five workmen?”

Most respondents say “Yes” to Switch but “No” to Footbridge. The interesting
question, then, is what makes the two cases distinct?
As Berker (2009) correctly notes, the traditional response in much of the
philosophical literature prior to Greene was to assume that the judgments about
the cases were correct (pp. 297-298). That is, assume that “Yes” to Switch but
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“No” to Footbridge are the correct normative answers. On such an assumption,
the task of the philosopher, then, was to locate some normative principle or other
that could (1) account for the difference in judgments about the cases but (2) be
robust or anti-fragile enough such that the principle could survive other cases

This is, I think, a fair interpretation of much of the trolley case literature,
running from (Foot 1967) through (Thomson 1976), (Thomson 1985), (Kamm
1989) and others. If you are an act-utilitarian, then you should be committed to
the view that answers to Switch and Footbridge should be the same. But, so long
as you are not an act-utilitarian such as Unger, then you have theoretical wiggle
room to come up with some other sort of account as to why judgments about the
cases do not violate a norm of consistency.
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without generation of counterintuitive result. So, for example, the Doctrine of
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Double Effect satisfies (1) but fails to satisfy (2), given that many moral
philosophers feel that it generates counterintuitive results in other trolley case
variants.
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It’s arguable that, to date, there has been no normative theoretical
explanation put forward that satisfies (1) and (2). If that is the case, then there are
two other options available: a kind of intuitionist particularism that denies the
need to satisfy (2) or a positivistic descriptive accounts that seeks to identify the
psychological factors – whatever they may be – that underlie the difference in
judgments.
Greene’s work on neuroethics takes the latter option. First, he starts with
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a pair of distinctions. First, distinguish two classes of judgment:
“characteristically consequentialist” and “characteristically deontological”
(Greene 2007). Judgments are “characteristically consequentialist” if they are
supported by a consequentialist criterion of right action, and they are
“characteristically deontological” if they are in line with a judgment that

This is just an application of the method of cases or conceptual analysis.
Assume the intuitions or judgments about the original cases are correct, find a
principle that captures a morally relevant difference between the cases, test the
principle against other cases, and rotate cases until you refine the principle such
that it covers all cases or until you run out of cases.
Such as, for example, the Loop Variant. See (Thomson 1985).
“Neuroethics” is ambiguous between the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics
of neuroscience. Whenever I use “neuroethics” in this paper, I am always
referring to the neuroscience of ethics. See (Farah 2010).
62

63
64

68

separates deontological from consequentialist judgments. Under this loose
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schema, “Yes” to Switch is characteristically consequentialist, and “No” to
Footbridge is characteristically deontological. Second, distinguish between two
kinds of psychological process. There are “emotional processes” that involve
behaviorally-valenced information processing that produces automatic effects,
and there are “cognitive processes” that involve inherently neutral
representation that do not produce automatic behavioral effects (Greene 2007).
If you combine these distinctions in the relevant way, then you get
Greene’s hypothesis that characteristically consequentialist judgments are driven
by cognitive processes while characteristically deontological judgments are
driven by emotional processes. In order to test the hypothesis neuroscientifically,
Greene takes two steps: first, identify areas of the brain that other neuroscientific
research implicates as necessary for emotional and cognitive processing. For
simplicity, let’s say that previous neuroscientific research has implicated the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and amygdala as necessary for emotional
processing and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as necessary for cognitive
processing. Then, one can test, using available neuroscientific methods such as
fMRI, which brain areas preferentially respond to characteristically
consequentialist and deontological judgments.

There are an obvious number of problems with this way of marking the classes.
One is marked by reference to a criterion of right action, the other by similarity
or resemblance. The “characteristically” does a lot of work here as well, for there
are disputes about whether the sorts of judgments Greene is interested in are
those that align with judgments rendered from the theoretical perspective. But I
will not delve deeper into these concerns here. For criticism of Greene on this
point, see (Kahane & Shackel 2010).
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A final note, which Berker also picks up on, is that fMRI is statistically
noisy, so you need to test against a large number of cases that have relevant
similarity to Switch and Footbridge. That requires that you hypothesize which
property may make a difference between the two cases. Greene’s original
hypothesis was that the difference maker was “personalness.” That is,
Footbridge is a “personal” case, while Switch is “impersonal.” Alternatively,
Footbridge satisfies but Switch does not the “ME HURT YOU” criterion:
The “hurt” criterion [= (a)] picks out the most primitive kinds of harmful
violations (e.g., assault rather than insider trading) while the “you”
criterion [= (b)] ensures that the victim be vividly represented as an
individual. Finally, the “me” criterion [= (c)] captures a notion of
“agency,” requiring that the action spring in a direct way from the agent’s
will, that it be “authored” rather than merely “edited” by the agent.
(Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen 2001)
With this criterion, one can generate enough cases of meant to be relevantly
similar to Switch and Footbridge and then use neuroscientific methods of
investigation to see if characteristically consequentialist and deontological
judgments track the distinction and then whether emotional and cognitive
processing corresponds to the judgments.
Greene found that personal dilemmas tended to generate
characteristically deontological judgments and activate emotional processing,
while impersonal dilemmas tended to generate characteristically consequentialist
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judgments and activate cognitive processing. Response times for emotionally
“incongruent” judgments to personal dilemmas (that is, “Yes” to Footbridge)
took longer (on average two second more) than “congruent” answers (“No to
Footbridge). As Berker (2009) summarizes Greene’s findings: “All told, Greene et
al.’s empirical results present an impressive case for their dual-process
hypothesis” (p. 305).
To summarize: Greene analyzed the Trolley Problem descriptively and
used available neuroscientific techniques to try to isolate a property that would
allow for a descriptive account of the Trolley Problem. He found some
neuroscientific evidence that characteristically consequentialist judgments tend
to correlate with cognitive processing and that characteristically deontological
judgments tend to correlate with emotional processing. The descriptive property
that figured as the difference maker was “personalness,” where this is spelled
out in terms of the ME HURT YOU criterion. From this finding, Greene has
argued for a dual-process theory of moral cognition, according to which there are
two systems of moral judgments. One system is quick, automatic, emotional and
behaviorally valenced, while the other is slow, deliberate, cognitive and
representationally neutral.
3

Berker’s Dilemma
We have just seen that Berker admits that Greene’s finds count as

evidence for the dual-process hypothesis and that the case is impressive.
Although Berker does have some quibbles with some aspects of the empirical
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methodology that Greene used, his primary complaint centers on the normative
implications that Greene (and others) attempt to draw from Greene’s work.
Famously, Greene is not just interested in neuroethics or in showing that
neuroscientific evidence supports the dual-process theory. He is also interested
in showing that neuroethics is normatively significant. That is, he is interested, at
least partly, in showing that we have reason to discount or reject
characteristically deontological judgments but not characteristically
consequentialist ones.
Berker correctly notes that this would have widespread implications for
normative theorizing, the most obvious of which is that most normative
theorizing ought to be abandoned as it would be a post hoc rationalization of
existing emotional biases. And Greene does push this line of argument against
deontological rationalists in some of his writings.
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However, it is not entirely clear how exactly Greene’s argument is
supposed to work or even what the argument is. Attempting to pin Greene
down, Berker (2009) delivers the following dilemma:
BERKER’S DILEMMA: [E]ither attempts to derive normative
implications from these neuroscientific results rely on a shoddy inference,
or they appeal to substantive normative intuitions (usually about what
sorts of features are or are not morally relevant) that render the
neuroscientific results irrelevant to the overall argument. (p. 294)
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See (Greene 2007) especially.
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The first thing to notice is that the dilemma is destructive. Either horn is fatal to
Greene’s larger normative project. Remember that the project is, in part, reliant
upon a psychological debunking argument. In short, the relevant psychological
data debunks the class of characteristically deontological judgments but leaves
intact the class of characteristically consequentialist judgments. Since these two
67

classes are supposed to be exhaustive of moral judgments and since we must
68

make some moral judgment or other in dilemma cases, we have reason to rely on
characteristically consequentialist judgments. However, the first horn says that
this conclusion is invalidly drawn. It could be correct but not on the basis of any
of the neuroscientific results. On the other horn, the neuroscientific results are
wholly irrelevant because of a substantive normative intuition about which
features are morally relevant. The moral intuition is doing all the work, and the
neuroscience is idle accoutrement. Either way, moral philosophers need not be
worried by Greene.
I have discussed Greene’s work with many members of the humanist
tradition, and most of these people have been unimpressed with his work. Some
feel that it does not live up to the argumentative standards of contemporary
Anglo-American philosophy, particularly the sort of argumentative standards
that are present in analytic metaethics. But most feel that Berker effectively
demonstrated that neuroscience per se lacks normative significance or normative
And because the data for the psychological debunking story is part
neuroscientific and looking for a natural kind, this kind of debunking strategy is
different than a cultural debunking one. I don’t have the space to further expand
this point here.
This is, of course, a very controversial point. Personally, I do not believe that the
two classes exhaust the domain. But I grant this for the sake of argument.
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upshot. But, with certain exceptions, many of these humanists have been
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unwilling to tackle Greene’s arguments head-on. Rather, these humanists have
just taken as obvious that Greene’s arguments are bad (or obviously demonstrated
as bad). I will argue that this is a mistake. Humanists ought to take Greene
seriously and engage with the substance of his views, rather than rely upon
second-hand judgments and antecedent normative commitments as excuse to
dismiss his research program.
4

Critique of Berker
With that in mind, I will turn now to my criticism of Berker. If I can show

that Berker either mischaracterizes Greene’s position or relies upon strong
normative commitments, then I can show that we have reason to reject Berker’s
location of the normative insignificant of neuroscience.
4.1

First Horn Explained
Let’s start with the first horn. There, Berker says that attempts to derive

normative implications from the neuroscience rely on shoddy (read: invalid)
inference. My strategy here is to quickly survey Berker’s proposed invalid
arguments and to argue that either Greene never proposed them in the first place
or that Berker is reading Greene in an aggressively uncharitable manner.

Along with Berker, see (Kleingeld 2014), (Wielenberg 2014), and (Lott 2016).
None pursue the line of argumentation I provide in this paper of addressing in
particular the problematic descriptive component of Greene’s program – the
characterization of System 2, which I discuss later – to provide the humanistic
critique.
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Here is the first example of shoddy inference Berker (2009, p. 316)
proposes:
REASON GOOD, EMOTION BAD
P. Deontological intuitions are driven by emotions, whereas
consequentialist intuitions involve abstract reasoning.
C. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not
have any genuine normative force.

The problem, obviously, is that the conclusion does not follow from the premise.
You need a bridging premise – perhaps: “all and only intuitions involving
abstract reasoning but not driven by emotions have normative force.” But,
further, this bridging premise could be secured only on the basis of arguing
against a long tradition in ethics that says that emotions disclose normative
truths. So the argument is invalid, and even if it weren’t, it would be
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tendentious and unsupported.
The second example of shoddy inference:
ARGUMENT FROM HEURISTICS
P1. Deontological intuitions are driven by emotions, whereas
consequentialist intuitions involve abstract reasoning.
P2. In other domains, emotional processes tend to involve fast and frugal
(and hence unreliable) heuristics.
C1. So, in the moral domain, the emotional processes that drive
deontological intuitions involve fast and frugal (and hence unreliable)
heuristics.
C2. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, are
unreliable.
70

See (Berker 2009, p. 316).
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There are two shoddy inferences here. First, identifying something as a heuristic
presupposes we can tell the difference between right and wrong answer and how
to reliably get to them. This is a problem with the validity of inferring C1 from P1
and P2. It could be the case that emotional processes in other domains are
unreliable but not in the moral-harm domain. Second, consequentialist
judgments also likely rely on heuristics, given that we are boundedly rational
agents. This is the inference from C1 to C2. These inferential problems are to the
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side of the argument that some heuristics are highly (perhaps perfectly) reliable.
So the argument is invalid, and even if it weren’t, it would be tendentious and
unsupported.
Here is the third and final example of shoddy inference:
EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY
P. Our emotion-driven deontological intuitions are evolutionary byproducts that were adapted to handle an environment we no longer find
ourselves in.
C. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not
have any genuine normative force.

This is perfectly parallel to the first argument. C obviously does not follow from
P without a further bridging principle linking environmental adaptation to
normative force. And this is aside from the fact that mathematical and scientific
judgments have normative force but evolutionary history. Greene could try to

That is, our brains do not compute all actual and expected consequences of
actions, and we have limited memory, computational powers, and so on.
71

76

save the account through an appeal to tracking, but then neuroscience drops out
of the picture. So the argument is invalid, and even if it weren’t, it would be
tendentious and unsupported, or neuroscience would be wholly irrelevant.
4.2

Reply to First Horn
Notice that in all of the arguments, either they are invalid or tendentious

while unsupported. That is, all of these arguments are constructed in such a way
that they are obviously invalid. On the assumption that we should not attribute
obviously invalid arguments to our interlocutors because of a demand of the
Principle of Charity, we should not attribute the charge of shoddy inference to
Greene.
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It is true that sometimes philosophers put forward invalid arguments.
And it is true that there is a phenomenon of the Principle of Charity going on
holiday. I mean that there are circumstances in which, in the move to be
charitable toward an interlocutor, we completely misconstrue their arguments by
cleaning them up for him or her.
However, I claim that the Principle of Charity demands that if we want to
attribute invalid arguments to our interlocutors, we better have airtight textual
evidence. I think that this is a claim that all philosophers have reason to accept. It
allows us to err on the side of charity while at the same time being able to call a
spade a “spade.”
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See (Davidson 1984).
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So my primary argument that Greene is not making these invalid
arguments is that, if he were, surely a philosopher as careful and thoughtful as
Berker would’ve cited instances of the invalid arguments. Berker does not cite
any instances, so Greene is not making these invalid arguments.
In the end, I think that Berker agrees with this diagnosis that Greene does
not land on the first horn. Berker (2009) writes:
Before turning to Greene’s and Singer’s central argument against the
probative force of deontological intuitions, though, I want to briefly
discuss three bad arguments for that conclusion. On a charitable
interpretation of Greene and Singer, these are arguments that they don’t
actually make but which it is extremely tempting to see them as making;
on an uncharitable interpretation of Greene and Singer, these are bad
arguments that they sloppily mix in with their main argument. My
guess is that the truth lies somewhere in between: although Greene’s and
Singer’s primary and most promising line of argumentation does not rely
on these three arguments, I think they occasionally give their main
argument more rhetorical force by invoking versions of these
arguments. So it is worth showing just how unconvincing these three
arguments are before we consider Singer’s and Greene’s main reason for
thinking that Greene et al.’s neuroscientific research gives us good reason
to privilege our characteristically consequentialist intuitions over our
characteristically deontological ones. (pp. 315-316, emphasis mine)
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Even on the uncharitable interpretation, these arguments are different than the
main argument. On the charitable interpretation, Greene does not make any of
the above arguments, and it is merely a temptation (of argumentative opponents)
to read these arguments into Greene. To be clear, I do not think that Greene
makes these arguments, and I think that Berker is tempted here. When he says
that they invoke these arguments for rhetorical force, he also fails to provide any
relevant citations to Greene. To be fair, I think that there are some arguments in
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the neighborhood, but these arguments are not deductions as Berker presents
them. Rather, they are abductive arguments within a particular normative
context that are meant to lend credence to normative conclusions. For example,
consider Evolutionary History. There is an abductive argument in the
neighborhood for not using judgments evolutionarily attuned to a different
social environment to solve the problem of, say, anthropogenic climate change. I
do not have the space to fully fill out this thought, but I trust the reader can fill it
in for themselves.
So if we ought not interpret Greene as making the invalid arguments, all
that is left of them is complaints that particular premises are undersupported or
tendentious or that other moral philosophers disagree with some premise or
needed bridging principle. But these are not logical errors or matters of shoddy
inference. These are matters of substantive debate. So, in the end, there isn’t
really a first horn in this dilemma, at least so stated.

Although he does cite Singer at one point. I agree that Singer is doing
something other than what Greene is doing, argumentatively. But this is outside
the scope of this paper.
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4.3

Evaluating the Second Horn
Again, the second horn says that attempts to derive normative

implications from the neuroscientific data rely on substantive normative
assumptions that render the neuroscience normatively insignificant. Here is the
argument that Berker (2009) attributes to Greene:
THE ARGUMENT FROM MORALLY IRRELEVANT FACTORS
P1. The emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions
responds to factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal.
P2. The factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal are
morally irrelevant.
C1. So, the emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions
responds to factors that are morally irrelevant.
C2. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not
have any genuine normative force. (p. 321)
It is worth noting at the start that Greene (2010) more-or-less accepts this
characterization of his view. So the only interesting question is whether Berker
has reasons sufficient to reject this argument.
Berker offers three different “worries” about this argument. The first
worry is that P1 might be false. The initial characterization of the “personal” /
“impersonal” distinction does not neatly track the “gives-rise-tocharacteristically-deontological” / “gives-rise-to-characteristicallyconsequentialist” judgment distinction. The ME HURT YOU criterion seems to
fall prey to Kamm’s Lazy Susan Variant:
LAZY SUSAN VARIANT:
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A runaway trolley is heading toward five innocent people who are seated
on a giant lazy Susan. The only way to save the five people is to push the
lazy Susan so that it swings the five out of the way; however, doing so will
cause the lazy Susan to ram into an innocent bystander. Is it appropriate
for you to push the lazy Susan so that the five people swing out of the
way?

As Berker (2009) says:
Kamm’s intuition about this case is characteristically consequentialist: she
thinks it is permissible to push the lazy Susan, thereby killing the one to
save the five. However, in doing so one would initiate a new threat (me)
that causes serious bodily harm (hurt) to a person (you), so this case
counts as a personal dilemma according to Greene et al.’s criteria. (p. 311)
This is meant to show that the Argument from Morally Irrelevant Factors cannot
go through as stated. We have a dissociation between the emotional processing
and the property that it is purported to respond to.
This particular worry, though, doesn’t seem to have much force. Or, at
least, it is not going to have much force against any empiricist moral
psychologists who is already metaphilosophically committed to methodological
naturalism and who is an experimentalist. One way to respond is to say that this
is an invitation for further refinement of the target property. This is how science
operates, and there is nothing especially troubling here.
The second “worry” is closely related to the first, so I bring it up now so
that I can address Worry 1 and Worry 2 with the same evidence. I quote the
Worry 2 in full:
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Even if we were able to find a way of characterizing the factors which
deontological judgments are responding to that makes P1 true, it is far
from clear that P2 would still seem plausible. It is one thing to claim that a
faculty which responds to how “up close and personal” a violation is
responding to morally irrelevant features, but quite another thing to claim
that a faculty which responds to whatever the sorts of features are that
distinguish the footbridge case from the trolley driver case is responding
to morally irrelevant features. Once we fix on what those features are, P2
may well strike us as false. (Berker 2009, p. 324)
This worry responds to my reply to the first worry. This says that even if we
suitably refine P1 so that it comes out true, P2 may be false. There exist
whichever sort of features distinguish Switch from Footbridge. But some of those
features may not seem morally irrelevant on reflection.
The reply here is two-fold: first, this reply essentially admits that “up close
and personal” as a criterion is easier to dismiss as morally irrelevant than other
features. That is, it is tacitly assumed by this reply that “personalness” is either
not really morally relevant in the moral-harm domain or that it is easier (relative
to unnamed alternatives) to dismiss personalness as morally irrelevant. This is a
major (but in my view sensible) concession to Greene, although there are some
moral philosophers who would want to insist that it’s morally relevant.
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I thank Justin Bernstein and Samuel Freeman for forcing me to clarify this point.
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The second reply is that this worry is a lot like the first: there could be
confounds. So the reply is a lot like the first: if you think that there are confounds
or that there could be confounds, then run some more experiments isolating
whatever you think has been blurred or shielded! Greene actually ran some more
experiments and found that people were much more likely to say “Yes” to
variants of Footbridge that involved a pushing a switch to release a trap door
(either up close or remotely) than to variants that involved directly pushing the
person (either with hands or with a pole). This puts additional, although not
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decisive, weight on the idea that a large number of people are preferentially
responding to some property closely in the neighborhood of personalness.
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The final worry is that the argument is invalid. C2 does not follow from
C1, unless we add a bridging premise that says that characteristically
consequentialist judgments do not respond to morally irrelevant factors. More
specifically, characteristically consequentialist judgments would have to be
shown not to overlook morally relevant factors. But, as Berker correctly notes, that
is exactly what non-consequentialist moral philosophers claim, and you can fill
in the factor with your favorite example (separateness of persons, integrity, and
so on).
Assume that this is true. Then, says Berker, the neuroscience is completely
normatively insignificant. We are now arguing about which factors are morally
relevant. In fact, Berker’s conclusion ought to be stronger than this, for
See (Greene 2010).
Where that involves something resembling ME HURT YOU combine with,
loosely, “touching.”
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psychology itself should fall out of the picture. If the point is just that we are now
in a normative argument about the relevance of factors in the world, then it
doesn’t really matter, from such a pure moral perspective, how we are able to
interact with those factors. All that matters is that those factors exists, some are
relevant, and some aren’t. Neuroscience falls out of the picture, but so does
psychology and any empirical domain. Berker doesn’t explicitly make this
inference, but it is directly implied by his argument.
The reply is that if neuroscience is normatively insignificant, then so is
psychology. But psychology is not. Therefore, neither is neuroscience. Unpacking
this argument, let us note that it is accepted practice in most psychology
departments and among most practicing psychologists that neuroscience can
serve as some evidence for a psychological theory (although there is no
particular need to ground every psychological theory in pure neuroscientific
evidence). Greene is trying to use neuroscientific evidence to support the dualprocess theory. The dual-process theory predicts that there are some cases where
the emotional, affective, quick system (call it System 1) will overgenerate and
produce incorrect answers. Unless there is a special argument that the moral
domain is unlike other domains – importantly, including other normative
domains – then there is no special reason to think that neuroscientific evidence
has nothing to say about the relevant moral psychology.
Berker has already admitted that the neuroscientific data for the dualprocess theory is impressive. If he admits that the dual-process theory is a
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psychological theory and that neuroscience supports it, then he must be
committed to the claim that psychology is a red herring.
However, psychology is not a red herring. Greene (2014) offers a way to
think about this. If you can combine a minimal normative claim with a
descriptive claim to generate a more powerful normative conclusion, then your
mixed argument is not question-begging or problematic. Greene offers an
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example: suppose you want to know whether juries in capital cases make unfair
decisions. Start with the minimal moral assumption that race is an irrelevant
factor for decision. Add the psychological premise that jurors decisions are
affected by the race of the defendant. You generate the stronger normative
conclusion that juries in capital cases make unfair decisions.
Perhaps Berker would want to respond here that “all the work” is being
done by the normative premise. But this cannot be correct. You cannot generate
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the conclusion without the descriptive premise any more than you can generate
it without the normative premise. It is special pleading to deny this point. Of
course, one could try to refine this point by saying that “all the normative work”
is done by the normative premise. But I am not sure what is added. If the point
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is that you cannot get an “ought” merely from an “is,” then the reply is that
Greene was never trying to do that. If the point is you need normativity to get
normativity, then everyone agrees to that. If the point is that neuroscience is
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See also (Kumar & Campbell 2010).
I thank Pierce Randal and Samuel Freeman for this point.
I thank Justin Bernstein for this point.
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wholly normatively insignificant, then one should specify the sense of
“normative significance” such that the point is interesting.
To summarize: Berker’s arguments against Greene either mischaracterize
Greene’s point or rely themselves on strong normative assumptions that we have
reason to reject. Both horns of the dilemma amount to the same claim: either the
argument is invalid or neuroscience would be wholly irrelevant. The obviously
invalid arguments should not be attributed to Greene. The case that neuroscience
is normatively insignificant is either false, special pleading, or lacks concrete
sense.
5

Greene’s Move to Moral Theory
That said, I do believe that Berker’s Dilemma applies to Greene! But the

question now is to locate the normative insignificance of neuroscience.
Remember my claim that if neuroscience is irrelevant, then so is psychology.
What we need to find is a juncture in Greene’s argument where the psychology
(and hence the neuroscience) is normatively insignificant. I do not believe that
you find this in the earlier work. However, I do believe that you find it in Moral
Tribes. There, Green is trying to use his prior work (as well as the work of others)
to support a global moral theory. The main argument of the book is that we
should all accept classical utilitarianism as the decision procedure for resolving
interpersonal and intrapersonal moral conflict because moral psychology
uniquely selects classical utilitarianism as the only method for resolving such
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disagreement. Because the purpose of universal morality is to resolve such
disagreement, classical utilitarianism is the one true universal morality.
Greene (2013) says that there are two fundamental moral problems : first,
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the Tragedy of the Commons, and, second, the Tragedy of Commonsense
Morality (pp. 14-15). “Morality” is the solution to the first tragedy, and
“metamorality” is the solution to the second. I will discuss each in turn.
The Tragedy of the Commons is familiar from Garret Hardin’s (1968)
work and from social science. We describe as situation as being a Tragedy of the
Commons when there is a social problem of cooperation created by a
misalignment of narrowly conceived self-interest and collective interest. In short,
everyone benefits if everyone cooperates, but everyone has an individual
incentive to defect from cooperation to maximize their expected utility.
According to Greene, this is the moral problem of selfishness, or Me and Us (2013,
p. 21).
Fortunately, says Greene, Mother Nature has lent us a helping hand in the
form of morality. He says: “Morality is a set of psychological adaptations that
allow otherwise selfish individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation (2013, p.
23). Given this definition, it is not surprising to see Greene (2013)vwrite
sentences such as “Morality evolved to enable cooperation” (p. 23). To many

Interestingly, it seems like the right way to interpret Greene is that these are
moral tragedies because each particular problem has an impact on human wellbeing. This will be important for my later argument that Greene is building his
moral philosophy into his moral psychology in order to vindicate his moral
philosophy, in a viciously and non-virtuously circular manner.
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working in the humanistic tradition, this is a misunderstanding of what morality
is. But, setting aside that point for now, we can see that Green offers an
evolutionary functionalist account of morality. There is a specific problem of
selfishness in a group, and our brains evolved over time to have a capacity for a
limited form of altruism – in particular, reciprocal altruism with in-group
members (Greene 2013, pp. 23-25).
However, according to Greene, there is the second tragedy, the Tragedy of
Commonsense Morality. Greene hypothesizes that different groups have
different moralities. These moralities regulate in-group individual selfishness by
disposing people to act in a manner consistent with reciprocal altruism. But
groups come into contact with one another, they have different moralities, they
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come into conflict, and that conflict affects human well-being. Morality, then,
solves the problem of the Tragedy of the Commons but creates the problem of
the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality. So what we need instead is a
metamorality, “a moral system that can resolve disagreements among groups
with different ideals, just as ordinary, first-order morality resolves disagreements
among individuals with different selfish interests” (Greene, p. 26).
I will discuss later in the diagnosis section of my paper how exactly the
moral psychology – in particular the dual-process theory – is supposed to factor
into this explanation. But for now notice that morality is an adaptation and

It’s always been unclear to me whether these are different moralities or different
prescriptions from the same morality.
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Greene suggests that it is perhaps fairly modular in nature. Metamorality, on the
82

other hand, is meant to rely upon some executive functioning and domaingeneral reasoning ability (aka, rely on System 2).
According to Greene, morality and metamorality both help to resolve
particular problems. The Tragedy of the Commons, one might reasonably
suppose, in endogenous to the human condition. The Tragedy of Commonsense
Morality, on the other hand, is an acute problem for people in a modern age,
Greene suggests. While he allows that many problems associated with the
Tragedy of Commonsense Morality have been solved by technical and legal
solutions, Greene (2013) highlights remaining problem of conflicting local
moralities: global poverty, violent conflict, terrorism, and global warming /
environmental degradation (p. 98). These are “moral conflicts” because groups
with different local moralities have either different moral values or different
orderings of the same moral values. However, note that each Tragedy concerns
issues that impact human well-being and that require cooperative solution:
Morality is nature’s solution to the problem of cooperation within groups,
enabling individuals with competing interests to live together and
prosper. What we in the modern world need, then, is something like
morality but one level up. We need a kind of thinking that enables groups
with conflicting moralities to live together and prosper. In other words, we
need a metamorality. We need a moral system that can resolve

In the psychological language, morality is largely a product of System 1
processing.
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disagreements among groups with different moral ideals, just as ordinary,
first-order morality resolves disagreements among individuals with
different selfish interests. (Greene 2013, p. 26)
However, it is not the case that any normative theory could qualify as a
metamorality. Rather, only normative theories that could in principle resolve the
Tragedy of Commonsense Morality can qualify as candidates for metamorality.
This restriction disallows certain sorts of normative relativist positions, such as
Gilbert Harman’s conventionalist ethic. Other relativist positions – such as a
83

constructivism that claims that all humans, really, have the same interests or
moral views – could in principle be allowed but would be ruled out on the
grounds that it’s not true that all humans have the same interests or moral
views. But the main normative theories that will be candidates for metamorality
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are those that tend toward anti-relativism and universalism. In short, the
normative theories should have the conceptual resources to diagnose and resolve
disputes between competing local moralities.
Note that this still leaves everything quite indeterminate. There are, in
principle, many normative theories that have the conceptual resources to
diagnose and resolve disputes between competing local moralities. Here Greene
introduces what I take to be the most important restriction in all of his work, a
restriction that ends up, according to him, leaving only one candidate for an
acceptable metamorality. I turn now to this restriction, in order to later discuss
See (Harman 1975).
At least at a level of grain that allows for the possibility of the Tragedy of
Commonsense Morality.
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how the combination of the restriction and the findings of moral psychology are
meant to secure classical utilitarianism as the correct metamorality.
6

Possession Argument
One argument that Greene uses extensively is what I will call the

Possession Argument. This argument is not fully articulated but is frequently
assumed in order for him to get to his requisite conclusion. What follows is a
rational reconstruction of his view.
According to the Possession Argument (PA), an acceptable global
morality system must satisfy two desiderata:
(D1) humans with basically normal psychologies must be able to
comprehend what the system asks of them for each action-choice,
and
(D2) humans with basically normal psychologies must care about or value
that which the morality system requires that they care about or value.
I bundle the cognitive and motivational components together as possession:
(PN1) humans must possess the psychological resources necessary to
comprehend and value what the morality system requires,
and
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(PN2) any morality system that individuals can’t comprehend or care
about properly or both is not an acceptable candidate for a global morality
system.
According to Greene, deep pragmatism (or classical utilitarianism) is the only
morality system that satisfies possession, and, thus, deep pragmatism is the
correct global morality system. PA is an argument from elimination.
But what is the argument from elimination that deep pragmatism is the
correct metamorality? There are two ways to tighten the solution space: first, we
examine existing proposals for a decision procedure that would resolve the
outstanding conflict and stipulate that those are the only proposals. In
contemporary Anglophone normative ethics, the three primary candidates are
virtue ethics, Kantian deontology, and utilitarianism. Second, we demand that
the candidates encapsulate values that are shared by all because it’s within the
context of a shared value that conflicts can be resolved by appeals to empirical
evidence. It’s partly because they don’t encapsulate share values that Greene
concludes that virtue ethics and Kantian deontology are unsuitable candidates
for metamorality.
Greene’s argument against virtue ethics is quite similar to his argument
against deontology. Greene argues against virtue ethics as follows:
(P1) Virtue ethics needs to appeal to the virtues to resolve conflicts.
(P2) Different tribes have different virtues.
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(P3) The different virtues of the different tribes conflict.
(P4) There is no rule of priority among the virtues that settles conflict
about the virtues.
(P5) Such a rule is necessary for virtue ethics to act as a decision
procedure.
(C) \, Virtue ethics is not an appropriate metamorality.
The argument against virtue ethics is similar to the argument against deontology.
Greene’s argument is deliberately targeted at modern forms of deontology that
stress a rights-based approach:
(P1) Rights-talk consists of evidence-insensitive moral demands.
(P2) Our automatic settings issue evidence-insensitive moral demands.
(C1) \, Our automatic setting issue rights-talk.
(P3) Relying on automatic settings creates or reinforces the tragedy of
common-sense morality.
(C2) \, Rights-talk creates or reinforces the conflict.
(P4) That which creates or reinforces the conflict can’t resolve the conflict.
(C3) \, Rights-talk can’t resolve the conflict.
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What’s similar in these arguments is that they are both forms of the argument
from disagreement. The argument against virtue ethics is explicit in this regard:
85

different tribes extol different virtues, and these different virtues conflict.
Because these conceptions of virtue are not universally shared across cultures,
we should be skeptical of the idea that appeals to virtue can solve the tragedy of
common-sense morality. In fact, the tragedy of common-sense morality is largely
a bi-product of cultures with different valuations of different character traits
violently disagreeing with one another. An example of this would be debates
about gender roles in society: different local moralities ascribe different character
properties to their normative ideal of, say, “woman.” The disagreements about
the schema for ‘woman’ translate into intertribal conflict about how best to
organize society with respect to women as well as which behaviors and attitudes
are appropriate of and toward women. Disagreement about the schema for
‘woman’ can’t be resolved by invoking a particular schema for ‘woman.’
The argument against rights-oriented deontology is an implicit argument
from disagreement. What’s important in the argument is that while it’s uniform
that we all have automatic settings or processes, the outputs of these setting or
outputs are not uniform and are strongly correlated with the particular local
morality that we were raised in. According to the argument, automatic settings
yield moral absolutes that are insensitive to evidence, and rights are a form of
moral absolutes that are insensitive to evidence. Different local moralities
disagree about what counts as a right. Some cultures believe that children have a
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See (Mackie 1990).
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right not to endure any form of corporal punishment. Other cultures believe that
parents not only have a right but also have an obligation to corporally punish
their children. Either side invoking its supposed “right” cannot resolve this
disagreement. The argument says that, by definition, when people argue using
the language of moral rights and rival disputants assert “P” and “Not P,” there is
no evidence that could get either side to rationally concede. Automatic settings
are automatic and, in this context, assumed to be inflexible.
In the next section, I will both discuss the positive argument that
utilitarianism satisfies PA and present an objection side-by-side. The objection
forces Greene into a dilemma that I will detail at the end of the section.
7

The Modal Objection to the Possession Argument
Now, let’s point out the obvious problem with Greene’s conclusion that

utilitarianism is the correct metamorality: it’s not clear that there is a sense of
“can” such that utilitarianism satisfies PA while deontology and virtue ethics do
not. Remember what PN2 tells us:
(PN2) any morality system that individuals can’t comprehend or care
about properly or both is not an acceptable candidate for a global morality
system.
Given what’s been said, we should expect that utilitarianism is the correct
metamorality. But Green does not show that. Rather, he shows that utilitarianism
may be the correct metamorality. Here is what I understand he proves – call it
Utilitarian Metamorality:
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P1. Utilitarianism is based on three ideas: experience is what matters, and
everyone’s experience counts the same, and we should maximize good
experiences and minimize bad experiences.

P2. Everyone cares about experience.

P3. Everyone can care about impartiality.

P4. Everyone cares about maximizing good experiences.

C1. \, Everyone can care about utilitarianism.

P5. It’s possible to resolve the conflict by appealing to values shared by all.

C2. \, Utilitarianism may resolve the conflict.

Some commentary on this argument is clearly necessary. First, remember that
this is an argument for utilitarianism as a decision procedure for resolving
conflict between competing groups with different local moralities. Second, P2
means that people care about experience because it’s experience, and not simply
because it’s their experience. Some may find this premise objectionable, but I
allow it for the sake of argument. Third, P5 is the optimistic interpretation about
the likely effects of metamorality on metamoral problems. Fourth, if it weren’t
already evident, I’m interpreting “cares” as “values,” in the sense that if we must
appeals to values shared by all, we must appeal to what all care about.
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As you can likely tell, I think the action lies at P3 and how we should
interpret it. But before that, we need to make sure Greene accepts P3. I think
Greene accepts P3 because anything stronger than P3 would be both false and bad
for his argument. For example,
P3*. Everyone cares about impartiality.

is clearly false, and besides being false, it’s being false is crucial for the tragedy of
common-sense morality to get off the ground. Remember that both the tragedy
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of the commons and the tragedy of common-sense morality both represent a
failure rooted in partiality. In the tragedy of the commons, the partiality is selfdirected, and in the tragedy of common-sense morality, the partiality is directed
toward the group of which I am a member. However, if
P3^. No one cares about impartiality.

then utilitarianism violates P4. Moreover, if P3^, then utilitarianism fails to
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satisfy possession, and failing to satisfy possession is sufficient to eliminate a
morality system from contention for metamorality.
Because P3^ would violate the possession requirement and because P3* is
obviously false, the best that Greene can develop by way of argument is a modal

The same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to the maximizing element of
utilitarianism. I have backgrounded the maximizing element for the sake of
argument, but I could run the same argument, with suitable modification and
reference to behavioral economics, on that element.
Another note on P3^ is that it’s false because of a combination of Bishop Butler
reasons and empirical facts. See (Butler 2006).
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claim that people can care about morality. That is, the values encapsulated in
utilitarianism, specifically the value of impartiality of ethical consideration, are
open to humans with otherwise normal psychologies.
How are we to interpret “can?” I can come to like indiscriminate violence,
in a certain sense of “can.” It’s a conceptual possibility. But in a practical or realworld context, it may also be appropriate to say that I can’t. My character is such
that there is no practical path by which I can come to like indiscriminate
violence, given the set of attitudes and beliefs that I have. If “can” is interpreted
in the first way, then I don’t see how that helps utilitarianism or counts in its
favor. We are after neither merely conceptual nor bare metaphysical possibility.
For if we were, then it’s surely true that it’s a conceptual possibility that people
can come to share the same virtue characterization or adherence to the same welldefined list of rights. But that implies that utilitarianism is no better off in this
regard than virtue ethics and deontology, and so the argument fails to deliver the
requisite conclusion.
But, in a “relative to an agent’s current psychological set” sense of “can,”
then not everyone can care about impartiality. That is, given most people’s
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current attitudes and beliefs and given how ingrained and recalcitrant those
attitudes and beliefs are, it is not true that there is a practical path by which
people can come to care about impartiality. This is the well-documented case of
loving relationships. There is a domain of justified partiality, most people feel,

Compare to Bernard William’s discussion of internal reasons in (Williams
1981a).
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and considerations of impartiality don’t full map out the justifications for acting
on certain kinds of impartiality. Impartiality doesn’t make me save my wife when
given the choice of saving my wife or saving a stranger, nor would invocations of
impartiality serve to justify the choice to my wife or others. As Williams (1981b)
would say, that’s “one thought too many,” and it represents a distorted
philosophical idealization of the substance of our ethical lives to pretend
otherwise.
So Greene owes us an account of “can” such that people can get
utilitarianism but not deontology or virtue ethics. I hazard to guess that such a
“can” does not exist.
8

21 Century Psychology Cannot Save the Possession Argument
st

Greene attempts to pull the relevant “can” out of his moral psychology, in
particular from his neuroscientific data. But, if you look at what he actually says,
there is little support for the idea that people can care about that which
utilitarianism requires that they care, in a sense of “can” that also eliminates
deontology and virtue ethics from consideration. Instead, what we receive is a
mish-mash of personal intuition, motivated appeals to spurious evidence, and
hand waving. But, if you do not know enough about the relevant neuroscience
and about philosophical moral theory, then it is easy to miss both where the
argument goes wrong and why someone as smart as Greene would put forward
arguments that are clearly bad.
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Let’s start with evidence that Greene attempts to answer to Modal
Objection by appealing to the brain. Greene attempts to sidestep the existence of
moral truth by focusing instead on the epistemology rather than the
metaphysics. He writes:
Once upon a time, I thought that this (TN: does moral truth exist?) was the
question, but I’ve since changed my mind. What really matters is whether
we have direct, reliable, non-question-begging access to the moral truth –
a clear path through the morass – not whether moral truth exists. For the
reasons given above, I’m confident we don’t have this kind of access. (If
there are authoritative ways to resolve moral disagreements that don’t
rely on divine revelation, pure reasoning, or empirical investigation, I’ve
not heard of them.) Once we’ve resigned ourselves to working with the
morass, the question of moral truth loses its practical importance. . . .
Resigned to the morass, we’ve no choice but to capitalize on the values we
share and seek our common currency there. (Greene 2013, pp. 188-189)
Here it is clear that Greene is searching for shared values because he believes that
we do not have reliable epistemic access to the moral truth, on the hypothesis
that the moral truth exists. That is, regardless of whether the moral truth exists,
we still face the problems caused by the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality, and,
hence, we still have a need for a metamoral solution. The metaphor of “common
currency” relied upon the idea that we can translate our moral concerns
(anchored in different values that are not shared) into some shared value or set of
shared values that allow for explicit comparison of different choice options. This
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means that, under a shared value, deliberations about what we ought to do will
largely come down to figuring out what the empirical and non-moral facts are
like.
If we remember the arguments against rights-based deontology and virtue
ethics, then we remember that the problem with each is that the relevant values
are not shared, or not shared widely enough. So, for example, different tribes
extol different rights or different virtues. You can’t appeal to one of those rights
or virtues in order to decide which right or virtue ought to be endorsed. You
need something else instead, some other value. Greene says that the shared
values concern experience, impartiality, and maximization. We all care (or can
care) about experience as experience. We all care (or can care) about impartiality.
We all care (or can care) about maximization. Combine the three, and you have
utilitarianism.
The evidence that these values are shared is supposed to come from
science itself. So, while science cannot tell us what the moral truths are, says
Greene, science can say which values are shared (and why) and which not (and
why). So consider:
I do not claim, however, that utilitarianism is the moral truth. Nor do I
claim, more specifically, and as some readers might expect me to, that
science proves that utilitarianism is the moral truth. Instead, I claim that
utilitarianism becomes uniquely attractive once our moral thinking has
been objectively improved by a scientific understanding of morality.
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(Whether this makes it the “moral truth” I leave as an open question.)
Although we may not be able to establish utilitarianism as the moral truth,
I believe that we can nevertheless use twenty-first-century science to
vindicate nineteenth-century moral philosophy against its twentiethcentury critics. (Greene 2013, p. 189)
I claim that Greene thinks that utilitarianism will be uniquely attractive because,
if the explanation works, only utilitarianism satisfies PA. And he explicitly
claims that science can show whether a particular candidate for metamorality
satisfies PA. If science can show that only one candidate can satisfy PA, then
science can “vindicate” utilitarianism in the sense that, if we agree that the
Tragedy of Commonsense Morality is something to be avoided, then, given
unique satisfaction of PA, we should avert to utilitarianism to solve problems
related to the environment, global poverty, terrorism and the like.
So what is the scientific evidence that vindicates utilitarianism?
Surprisingly, there does not exist scientific evidence that people care about
experience as experience, care about impartiality, and care about maximizing
good experience as such. Or, if such evidence exists, Greene does not provide it.
For the sake of argument, I accept Greene’s argument that System 2 is a
maximizing system. That is, for any value backgrounded by the system, the
system will try to maximize that value. The work of Kahneman and Tversky,
especially Prospect Theory, attempts to explain satisficing and loss aversion as
primarily a function of System 1, such that a maximizing System 2 could, in
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principle (or at least for some people), override the aversion. Maximizing per se
89

is not the target.
Moreover, I will not, in this paper, argue extensively against the idea that
people care about experience as experience. Greene does not offer psychological
or neuroscientific evidence that people value experience as experience. By
“experience as experience,” I mean experience as such. This is the familiar idea
from the classical utilitarian tradition that no one’s experience counts for any
more than anyone else’s experience and that my current experience does not
count for more than my later experience simply in virtue of happening now.

90

Greene deploys traditional philosophical argumentation and intuition-pumping
in order to secure this consideration. So, for example, he rehearses a familiar
Aristotelian regress argument meant to show that asking “why care about that?”
in relation to happiness has a quizzical or nonsensical air. But intuitions vary on
this point, and plenty of people do not think the question so quizzical.
Ultimately, Greene balks at extending the regress argument to secure the
conclusion that all that really has value is happiness – he remains content with
the idea that many chains do in end happiness. I am willing to spot him this
conclusion.
Greene also does not offer psychological or neuroscientific evidence that
people value impartiality, and I am not willing to spot him the conclusion that
people care about impartiality. Nor am I willing to spot him the conclusion that
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See (Kahneman 2011).
See (Sidgwick 1981).
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people can care about impartiality, with some interpretation of “can” such that
people cannot come to value what’s required by deontology or virtue ethics.
Again, there are two components here: people must have the conceptual
resources to understand what impartiality is, and people must have the
motivational resources to care about impartiality, in the sense of being able to act
from direct impartial concern.
Greene goes through standard evidence that shows that most human
beings are partialist and that their sympathies and altruistic concerns for others
are limited in various ways. This includes evidence concerning kin altruism,
direct reciprocal altruism, and indirect reciprocal altruism. Limited altruism is a
91

primary driver of the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality. So what Greene needs
is some way to escape parochial altruism – some metamorality, the components
of which people are able to possess.
Grant that System 2 is a maximizing system that seeks to produce optimal
consequences. A good question to ask, as Greene (2013) himself notes, is
“Optimal for whom” (p. 199)?
Note that you simply cannot appeal to System 2 itself to answer this
question, as one who does not know much about cognitive psychology,
behavioral economics, or neuroscience may want to do. Maximizing per se does
not answer the question, and “for whom?” is an input into the system, rather
than a weight of the system that operates on inputs to produce outputs. System 2
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For a more detailed discussion, see (Wilson, E. O., & Hölldobler, B. 2005).
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is a general-purpose action planner that “is, by necessity, a very complex device
that thinks not only in terms of consequences but also in terms of the trade-offs
involved in choosing one action over another, based on their expected
consequences, including side effects” (Greene 2013, p. 199) However, we can
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(and do, as a matter of fact) treat deontological and virtue ethical considerations
as goals (as potential end-state consequences), and we can have trade-offs
between competing considerations. For example, we may want to produce a state
of affairs where we act as the virtuous person would act. Accept for the sake of
argument that there are multiple virtues and that the virtues are distinct and
non-identical. Accept for the sake of argument that the virtuous person is the
person with virtues V1, V2, . . ., Vn. We may have alternative actions {A1, A2, . .
93

., An} to choose from. Some virtues will call for certain actions, other virtues for
other actions. But there exists some determinate action that is the action that the
virtuous person would do. Among that set of alternative actions is the action that
the virtuous person would do, and presumably that action would involve
choosing one action over others, based (at least in part) on a consideration of
expected consequences, including side effects. The virtuous person could decide
to act partially or to discount the considerations of at least some others in the
causal wake of the action. All this is consistent with the characterization of
System 2. So we need additional material to get to impartiality, for it is consistent
with System 2 that it produces an ethical output that does not yield the relevant
partiality.
92
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Moral Tribes, 199.
See (Hursthouse 1996).
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Greene offers two ways to get to impartiality, but neither has much to do
with relevant psychological or neuroscientific research. The first concerns selfish
individual actors deciding how to split a pot. Say that there are ten actors and
one-thousand coins. No actor has a threat advantage over any other actor. How
to split? The solution, says Greene, is an equal split, for there are no power
asymmetries that could give rise to a motive to defect from equal split. The
solution is “stable,” in the sense that no individual actor has an incentive to
defect from equal splitting.
But notice that this is just game-theoretic analysis and has nothing in
particular to do with how actual human beings make their decisions. Of course,
if people were trying to maximize their own well-being and if there were no
power asymmetries, then people would have the conceptual and motivational
resources necessary for them to “get” impartiality. But we already know that
people and the world are not like that: people are not merely selfish (the
evidence of limited altruism proves that) and power asymmetries have always
existed (anthropology, history and political awareness proves that). How do
creatures like us who live in conditions such as ours come to “get” impartiality?
Greene tries another to get to impartiality in another way by drawing on
one of the central ideas of Peter Singer’s The Expanding Circle (1981). Greene starts
this time with human agents who are predominantly egoist. People care for
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themselves, for their families, for the friends, and for relevant in-group members.
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A much more faithful model for actual human agents.
106

I quote to show that there is no relevant psychological or neuroscientific data
that backs up the move:
People, for the most part, don’t care very much about complete strangers.
But at the same time, people may come to appreciate the following fact:
Other people are, more or less, just like them. They, too, care most of all
about themselves, their family members, their friends, and so on.
Eventually, people may make a cognitive leap, or a set of cognitive leaps,
culminating in a thought like this: “To me, I’m special. But other people
see themselves as special just as I do. Therefore, I’m not really special,
because even if I’m special, I’m not especially special. There is nothing
that makes my interests objectively more important that the interests of
others.” (Greene 2013, p. 200, emphasis mine.)
This is a hand-waving explanation of a crucial component of utilitarianism.
Remember that science was supposed to help pick out utilitarianism as a
particular attractive metamorality. But, when we get to the important part of
people “getting” all the components of utilitarianism, science exits, and magic
comes in.
The first leap comes when people appreciate that others care about the
things that they themselves care about. Even here, we have it that people may
come to appreciate this fact. Of course, they may not. This is merely to throw us
back again on the problem of the Modal Objection. What is the sense of “may
come” such that people will not and cannot come to appreciate that which
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deontology or virtue ethics requires that they appreciate? Second, there is no
compelling scientific evidence that I am aware that suggests that most people do
in fact appreciate that fact or that they may come to. What we have here is either
some sort of optimism in people (which would be surprising given some of the
things that Greene has said about the folk in other parts of Moral Tribes), or some
sort of importing of moral content into the psychological explanation. That is,
Greene needs it to be the case that people can cognitively and motivationally get
the idea of impartiality. But he should be committed to the idea that we can say
that people can cognitively and motivationally get the idea of impartiality on the
basis of reliable scientific evidence. This is psychological speculation of exactly
the sort that Greene deplores humanists as engaging in.
The second leap (or series of leaps) comes when people move from the
idea that everyone basically cares about the same things to the incredible ideas
found in the imagined monologue at the end of the quote. People move from the
first idea to “To me, I’m special” to “To each person, he/she/they are special” to
concluding that “I’m special, but not especially special” to “there is nothing that
makes my interests objectively more important that the interests of others.”
There are a couple of striking things here.
First, again, people “may make” the additional series of leaps eventually.
There is the already stated problem concerning “may make.” But “eventually” is
another problem altogether. How much time are we allowed to grant for
“eventually” to have purchase for utilitarianism but not for deontology and
virtue ethics? Here, the relevant sense of “can” is not one relevant to choice at the
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current moment. If we allow that people eventually may make such additional
leaps, then why can we not allow that people may make such additional leaps as
is required of the other theories?
Second, the whole line of thought is just one massive non-sequitur and is
invalid at each step. If people reason in such a way, then this cannot possibly be
rational evidence of utilitarianism or the component under consideration. I am
inclined to think that if this is how people get to “get” impartiality, then we have
a debunking argument against the idea of impartiality, based upon its improper
etiology. Invalidly drawn conclusions may be true or false, but you need some
other chain of reasoning or evidence to establish them as true or false. The story
given should not affect your antecedent commitments.
Third, you cannot even get to impartiality from these considerations
alone. The selfish nihilist can accept the conclusion of the reasoning but not
accept impartiality. The nihilist is one who thinks that nothing is objectively
more important than anything else. But that does not imply that the nihilist does
not find some things more important. If selfish, then the nihilist privileges his
interests over others while also holding that there is no objective basis for him to
do so. The same is true, with appropriate modifications, for certain relativist and
subjectivist views.
In fairness to Greene, he acknowledges this. However, the answer that he
gives to this objection is unsatisfying:
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But it seems that, somehow, we do manage to translate this intellectual
insight into a preference, however weak, for genuine impartiality. I
suspect that this translation has something to do with empathy, the ability
to feel what others feel. Human empathy is fickle and limited, but our
capacity for empathy may provide an emotional seed that, when watered
by reasoning, flowers into the ideal of impartial morality. (2013, p. 201)
This will not work, though. First, a “weak preference” for genuine impartiality is
not enough. What is required is that people have an overriding preference for
genuine impartiality in areas of metamoral concern. If people merely have a
weak preference, then that preference will be trumped by other preferences in
the relevant profiles. But that is just to say that people will not, in fact, be
motivated to act on the idea of impartiality, which is just to say that
utilitarianism fails to satisfy PA. Second, what does it mean to be “watered by
reasoning?” The metaphor is inapt, for Greene holds that the relevant kind of
reasoning is the sort of stuff that System 2 does. But we have already said that
System 2 is a maximizing-relative-to-a-value system. There is no obvious or
perhaps foreseeable path from “Maximize the pleasurable experiences of those to
whom I have concern” to “Maximize the pleasurable experiences of all people.”
That is exactly what is at stake.
Greene (2013) ultimately ends up admitting that he has no idea how the
idea of impartiality came about in humans with the sorts of brains they have.
But, he says,
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I’m fairly confident of two things. First, the ideal of impartiality has taken
hold in us (we who are in on this conversation) not as an overriding ideal
but as one that we can appreciate. None of us lives perfectly by the
Golden Rule, but we all at least “get” it. Second, I’m confident that the
moral ideal of impartiality is a manual-mode phenomenon. This ideal
almost certainly has origins in automatic settings, in feelings of concern
for others, but our moral emotions are themselves nowhere near impartial.
Only a creature with a manual mode can grasp the ideal of impartiality.
(p. 201)
Note that this is only a possible explanation of the cognitive grasp of
impartiality, not the motivational grasp. An overriding ideal, on this construal,
would be one that would motivate us at each choice-point. But we are not so
motivated. Rather, we “get” impartiality. I see no way to read this passage that
says anything above that we have the conceptual tools to understand what
impartiality requires of us. Notice again that there is no psychological or
neuroscientific evidence that is brought to bear on this question. Rather, there is
Greene’s confidence that anyone who has to capacity to ask the metamoral
question has the conceptual resources to understand impartiality. This
confidence is less than the advertised standard of proof Greene offered before.
Moreover, there is again the idea that impartiality (or genuine impartiality,
extending to all) comes about from System 2 operations. But given everything
said about System 2 above, we have absolutely no reason to accept that
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characterization. Moreover, given everything that Greene has said about System
2, it is completely unclear what the scientific evidential basis is for his confidence.
We still have the lingering motivational component. Greene offers an
unclear analogy to explain the motivational component. There is a difference
between shopping for food while hungry and while full. We can be motivated to
shop for food based entirely on automatic settings. But we can also be motivated
to shop for food while completely full. Even though shopping while full will
have something to do with your automatic settings, it does not fully rely on your
automatic settings. Your manual settings can allow you to shop for things that
you do not desire at all presently, on the basis that you can project into the future
what you would like. You can also shop for other people’s food. If you relied
merely on automatic settings, then you would just get the things you like. The
moral, at the end of this confusing metaphor:
Somehow, the human brain can take values that originate with automatic
settings and translate them into motivational states that are susceptible to
the influence of explicit reasoning and quantitative manipulations. We
don’t know exactly how it works, but it clearly does. (Greene 2013, p. 202)
Appeals to brute fact are surprising here. The whole point was that science was
supposed to show why utilitarianism was particularly attractive as a
metamorality. But how does this metaphor even work? We have problems
dealing with individual selfishness. Limited altruism helps solve some of the
problems associated with individual selfishness. But we also have problems of
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group selfishness. So System 2 just hijacks the output of System 1 (limited
altruistic concern) and translates that output into some kind of motivational state
such that people either care about or can care about genuine or full impartiality.
This is not a genuine scientific explanation. This is pounding on the table in order
to continue to secure the conclusion that utilitarianism is the correct
metamorality.
I conclude this section by underlining the fact that Greene has not
established his case as he said he did. He said that science would show that
utilitarianism is the most attractive candidate for metamorality by showing how
utilitarianism satisfies PA. But, when we get to impartiality, Greene offers a
mish-mash of motivated appeals to evidence, intuition-pumping, motivated
appeals to brute facts, and so on. If we pay attention to how humans act and if
we pay attention to relevant features of System 2, we see that there is no way that
Greene was able to pull the rabbit out of the hat with the resources that he has.
9

Conclusion
In this paper, I have diagnosed different problems with the moral

psychology offered by Joshua Greene. I started with showing that the objection
that most humanists take as decisive – Berker’s Dilemma – actually lacks force
because it is involved in exactly the sort of game of smuggling normative content
that it accuses Greene of and because it grants to Greene too many of the
descriptive components for those normative complaints to have any upshot.
Then I turned my attention to the particular normative claims that Greene wants
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to make. I exposed how those normative claims turn on how we are to
understand the Possession Argument: that human beings with otherwise normal
psychologies must have the cognitive and motivational resources necessary to
“get” what the particular candidate for metamorality says they must get. One
way to understand this point is to grasp that any particular normative theory
will bring with it some empirical or psychological commitments as well. If we
can show that those empirical or psychological commitments cannot be cashed
out satisfactorily, then we have provided at least some reason to reject the
normative theory under consideration.
Greene thought that he could show that people can “get” utilitarianism
but not “get” rights-based deontology or virtue ethics. What I have attempted to
do is force Greene into a dilemma:
(D1) Either people have the cognitive and motivational resources to “get”
utilitarianism and also deontology and virtue-ethics, or
(D2) People do not have the cognitive and motivational resources to get
deontology and virtue ethics and also utilitarianism.
My support for the dilemma came about by closely examining what sort of
evidence that Greene provided to show that people “get” utilitarianism. I
provided the Modal Argument to show that it cannot be the case for Greene that
people, right now, in fact, “get” utilitarianism in the right way. If they did, then
there would be no issue of metamorality. Instead, at best, people “can get”
utilitarianism. We can revise the dilemma:
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(D1*) Either people have the cognitive and motivational resources such
that they can “get” utilitarianism and also deontology and virtue ethics, or
(D2*) People do not have the cognitive and motivational resources such
that they can “get” deontology and virtue ethics and also utilitarianism.
But Greene still requires evidence that he can get out of the dilemma, that people
can “get” utilitarianism but not potential metamoral rivals. I argued that he
thinks that science will provide us with the relevant sense of “can.” There is
something about the brain, he thinks, that makes utilitarianism quite attractive.
But when we looked at the evidence, we noticed that he admits that
System 2 is a general-purpose maximizing-relative-to-a-value system. So there
has to be some other way for people to come to cognitively and motivationally
grasp utilitarianism. First, Greene offered a game-theoretic story involving pure
egoists with equal threat advantage. This is a thought experiment and does not
rise to the level of psychological evidence in the relevant way (we are after
descriptive models, not normative models). Second, Greene appealed to Singer’s
idea of the expanding circle. But Greene’s version of the reasoning behind the
expansion is invalid and lends no rational weight to utilitarianism. Moreover,
there is no explanation of the mechanism by which one comes to full impartiality
from that reasoning, for the reasoning does not end in full impartiality (just that
nothing objectively matters). Finally, we saw Green appeal in both the cognitive
and motivational cases to brute facts, but he is not entitled to that appeal (and by
his own evidential standards).
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I have made the kinds of arguments that I have made by appealing to a
wide range of considerations, including game theory, social science, cognitive
science and ethical theory. But the general thrust of my argument can be reduced
to the following: Greene is an ardent utilitarian who would like others to also be
utilitarians. From this, he engineers a moral psychology that is meant to show
that utilitarianism is the most attractive candidate for universal morality. This
kind of circularity is bad.
The arguments that I have provided have attempted to identify and
eliminate excesses of moral content in Greene’s psychological explanation. I have
attempted to draw from diverse evidence bases – importantly, including social
science, cognitive science, and ethical theory – to show how Greene’s moral
psychology is really in the service of his utilitarian ethic. The moral psychology
itself, and the evidence offered for it, provides insufficient rational support for
utilitarianism in the end. But, when we look at how Green ignores what he
acknowledges to be the case about System 2 in order to secure claims about the
possession of impartiality, we can see that moral content is infecting his
psychological explanation. He knows that he needs a psychological explanation,
but, in the end, we are not given one. We have appeals to intuition, to brute fact,
and to features of System 2. But, given what we know of System 2 and what
Greene admits, System 2 could never, by itself, transform limited altruism into
full impartiality. That is what Greene needs for his arguments, so that is what he
claims.
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The moral of this paper, then, is that we should be wary of those with a
normative agenda who are also doing psychology. In particular, we should be
wary of psychological explanations that are just so convenient for securing some
determinate normative conclusion. The suspicion is that, when you examine the
arguments and evidence concerning psychologies uniquely picking our
normative theories, the normative theory has already been illicitly imported at
some step. The importing need not take the form of putting some determinate
moral principle in the head; rather, you can have the import of moral content
into psychological explanation when the psychologist is offering a purportedly
neutral psychological characterization that just so happens to have some particular
normative upshot. When some moral psychologist or philosophers introduces
some psychological mechanism or explanation just to secure a normative
conclusion, you should nearly always reject the mechanism or explanation. But
this requires some understanding of the relevant normative considerations, and
normative theory, at play.
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